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ESSAY
The Political Economy of
Corporate Exit
Susan S. Kuo*
Benjamin Means**
Corporate political activity is understood to include financial
contributions, lobbying efforts, participation in trade groups, and political
advertising, all of which give corporationsa "voice" in public decisionmaking.
This Essay contends that the accepted definition of corporatepolitical activity
overlooks the importance of "exit." Corporationsdo not need to spend money to
exert political influence; when faced with objectionable laws, they can threaten
to take their business elsewhere. From the "grab your wallet" campaign to the
fight for LGBT rights in states such as Georgia, Indiana, and North Carolina,
corporate exit has played a significant role in recent political controversies.
This Essay offers the first account of corporateexit as a form of political
activity and identifies two basic rationales:(1) attachingeconomic consequences
to public choices, and (2) avoiding complicity with laws that violate a
corporation'svalues. This Essay also shows how citizens can harness corporate
economic power when conventionalpoliticalchannels are inaccessible.In an era
of hashtag activism and boycotts sustained via social media, corporations
cannot afford to ignore consumers, employees, investors, and other stakeholders.
......
.......................................
INTRODUCTION.
...................................
EXIT AS INFLUENCE
I.
.....
Redefining CorporatePoliticalActivity .....
A.
..................
Why Exit Has Been Overlooked
B.

1.
2.

1294
1298
1299
1302

.......... 1303
Input Versus Deliberation....
................ 1304
The Race to the Bottom

Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. The authors thank Derek
Black, Josie Brown, Cathy Hwang, Martin McWilliams, and Elizabeth Pollman for helpful
comments on previous drafts. Jacob Taylor provided excellent research support.
*

**

1293

1294
II.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
THE POLITICIZATION OF ECONOMIC CHOICES.

A.
B.
C.
III.

IV.

...........

1307

Social Media..............
.............. 1309
Citizens United and Hobby Lobby
............. 1310
Supply Chains...........................1312

CORPORATIONS AS MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS

A.
B.

[Vol. 71:4:1293

............

1315

Signaling Effects.........................1317
Supporting LGBT Rights
................... 1320
1.
Georgia.
..............................
1322
2.
Indiana............
.................. 1323
3.
North Carolina
....................... 1324

Two THEORIES OF CORPORATE EXIT....
............
1325
A.
PricingInjustice....................................
...... 1326
B.
Avoiding Complicity..............................
...... 1328

CONCLUSION........................................

........ 1331

INTRODUCTION

Critics contend that corporations subvert democracy by using
their economic resources to lobby for corporate-friendly policies and to
elect accommodating politicians.' Those who take a more sanguine
view-notably, a majority of the Supreme Court-reject the claim that
corporate dollars corrupt the political process. 2 Yet, there is general
agreement that corporate political activity includes financial
contributions, lobbying efforts, participation in trade groups, and
political advertising, all of which give corporations a "voice" in public
decisionmaking. 3
1.
See LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA Is LOBBYING: How CORPORATIONS BECAME
POLITICIZED AND) POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 3-4 (2015) (arguing that corporations invest
the time and money necessary for lobbying success); Victor Brudney, Business Corporationsand
Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 237 (1981) (arguing that
corporate managers use the "wealth and power" of the corporation "to move government toward
goals that management favors"); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts' Role in
Eroding "We the People's"Ability to ConstrainOur Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R. -C.L. L. REV.
423, 433 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court "gave corporations the ability to influence the
political process more directly, which has therefore in turn made elected officials more responsive
to moneyed interests, and therefore as a matter of logic, less responsive to less wealthy citizens").
2.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010) (holding that "independent
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption"); Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General
Motors: CorporateSpeech and the Theory o/FreeExpression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 236 (1998)
("To exclude corporate expression from the scope of the free speech clause .. , would be unwisely
to shut out from public debate a substantial amount of relevant, provocative, and potentially vital
information and opinion on issues of fundamental importance to the polity.").
3.
See, e.g., David Min, Corporate Political Activity and Non-shareholderAgency Costs, 33
YALE J. ON REG. 423, 425 n. 1 (2016) (stating that corporate political activity potentially "includes
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This Essay contends that the accepted definition of corporate
political activity is too narrow and overlooks the importance of "exit." 4
When faced with objectionable laws or regulations, corporations can
take their business elsewhere.5 Consequently, in order to preserve jobs
and tax revenue, elected officials often cater to corporate interests. 6 Put
differently, exit gives corporations, individually and collectively, the
leverage to influence public choices.
The ongoing fight for LGBT civil rights provides a striking
example of the power of corporate exit.' By making clear that they are
unwilling to do business in places that deny equal treatment to LGBT
people, corporations have been instrumental in defeating proposed
state laws that would restrict transgender bathroom access or permit
business owners to refuse services to gay, lesbian, or transgender
people. 8 For example, after corporations signaled their intention to

direct contributions to political candidates . . ., independent political expenditures . . .,
contributions to political parties, contributions to PACs, contributions to Super PACs,
contributions to trade groups and advocacy groups, advertising meant to move public policy, the
hiring of former political officials, as well as expenditures related to lobbying" (citing Jay B.
Kesten, ShareholderPoliticalPrimacy, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 161, 163 n. 1 (2016))).
4.
As discussed infra Section I.A, "exit" and "voice" represent alternative approaches to
problem-solving in collective context. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY:
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
5.
STAN LUGER, CORPORATE POWER, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, AND THE AUTOMOBILE

INDUSTRY 25 (2000) ("[I]n an era when capital has become increasingly mobile ... the prospect of
investment flight places government officials under constant pressure to maintain a positive
business climate."). The availability of exit is subject largely to pragmatic constraints. If a
jurisdiction has unique characteristics-for example, access to oil reserves-or if existing
operations would be difficult to move, exit becomes more expensive. See Rachel I. Massey, The
Credibility of Exit Threats: Refining the "Race to the Bottom" Debate, 10 J. PUB. & INT'L AFF. 47,
53-54 (1999) (identifying, inter alia, "[slize of required fixed investment" and "[rieliance upon a
local, exhaustible natural resource" as factors governing the availability of exit).
6.

CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC

SYSTEMS 172-73 (1977) (arguing that corporations enjoy unmatched influence in our political
system because they make decisions that affect the creation and allocation of economic resources
and "economic distress can bring down a government"). Although we follow standard usage in
referring to corporate political activity, the concept should be understood to include other types of
business associations, including partnerships and limited liability companies.
See, e.g., Sandhya Somashekhar, Georgia Governor Vetoes Religious Freedom Bill
7.
Criticized As Anti-gay, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.cominews/postnation/wp/2016/03/28/georgia-governor-to-veto-religious-freedom-bill-criticized-as-antigay/?utm term=.3c99f9837f07 [https://perma.cc/E8JY-VLRK] (recounting effect of corporate
influence on veto of bill). The characterization "anti-gay" for provisions designed to stigmatize gay
people and to license discrimination against them should not be taken as a more general critique
of religious freedom laws, which "have been valuable for religious minorities who often have no
other recourse when the law conflicts with their most basic religious obligations." CHRISTOPHER C.
LUND, Keeping Hobby Lobby in Perspective, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 285,

289 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016).
8.
See infra Section III.B.
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remove business from the state, Georgia's governor vetoed a bill that
would have legalized discrimination against same-sex couples. 9
Although a question of democratic legitimacy arises when
corporations stand between public officials and the will of the majority,
we argue that corporate exit should be understood as a part of the
democratic process. When conventional political channels are
inaccessible,1 0 citizens can harness corporate economic power instead.
Corporations are not democratic institutions, but they answer to
consumers, employees, investors, and other stakeholders." Also, when
corporations operate in national as well as local markets, they can
accelerate progress toward the universalization of certain kinds of
norms. 12 Thus, corporations can mediate between citizens and their
elected representatives as well as between local, state, and national
political communities.
To be clear, this Essay does not contend that corporations will
reliably protect the powerless or guide politicians to a deeper
appreciation of liberty, equality, or justice. 13 Corporations seek to
maximize their profits and may threaten to exit jurisdictions in order
to extract concessions that benefit their shareholders at the expense of
other constituencies. 14 For this reason, corporations may take positions
that are detrimental to economic, environmental, or social justice.1 5
9.

Somashekhar, supranote 7.
See CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY
ELECTIONS Do NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 1-4 (2016) (arguing that citizens are
disengaged from politics and therefore elections do not provide an opportunity to constrain public
officials); K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 179 (2016) ("In a country that
claims democracy as its birthright, it is remarkable how widespread and deep-seated a sense of
democratic failure has become.").
11. See infra Section II.A.
12. See infra Section III.A. National standardization of norms may not always be desirable.
See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 30 (1983) (defending the "quasi-autonomous" character of insular religious
communities such as the Amish and the Mennonites).
13. Even if corporations could be depended upon to advance public values of this kind, they
would not agree about the content or relative priority of such values. For example, some
corporations claim a religious identity and mission and seek to limit antidiscrimination rules;
others emphasize secular values of equality and inclusion.
14. See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Breaching a Leaking Dam?: CorporateMoney and Elections, 4
CHARLESTON L. REV. 91 (2009); Robert H. Sitkoff, CorporatePolitical Speech, PoliticalExtortion,
and the Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103 (2002). To the extent
corporations are meant to focus on shareholder profits, such efforts are understandable. See Jill E.
Fisch, How Do CorporationsPlay Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1501 (2005)
(arguing that "political activity is not a dispersion of shareholder funds, but an integral and
necessary part of a corporation's operating strategy").
15. See Samuel Issacharoff, On PoliticalCorruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 118, 127 (2010) ("The
public choice accounts of recent political economy claim that the existence of public power is an
occasion for motivated special interests to seek to capture the power of government . .. to realize
private gains through subversion of state authority.").
10.
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More generally, there is reason to worry that the political power of
corporations will entrench economic inequality.16
Nevertheless, we contend that corporations can exert their
political influence for public good as well as private profit. Indeed, we
argue that corporate social responsibility requires some level of political
engagement. The normative argument rests upon two propositions.
First, we contend that corporations should aspire to more than
commercial integrity and compliance with existing laws.' 7 In
particular, we proceed on the assumption that corporations are capable
of engaging socially divisive issues18 and that corporations are
permitted to consider stakeholder interests as well as profits. 19
Second, we argue that economic markets facilitate democratic
contestation. Citizens express ethical, moral, and political views not
only in deciding how to vote and what groups to join but also in deciding
what to buy and where to shop. 20 In this regard, individuals
increasingly "participate in political action aimed at corporations rather
16. See Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 669, 693 (2014) ("Extreme concentrations of economic and political power undermine equal
citizenship and equal opportunity."); David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign
Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1370 (1994) (arguing that campaign finance reform
efforts should focus on equality rather than corruption). However, the impact of corporate political
activity on social inequality should not be considered in isolation. See Benjamin Means, Wealth
Inequality and FamilyBusinesses, 65 EMORY L.J. 937, 951-54 (2016) (criticizing piecemeal reform
proposals that fail to consider the impact of incremental changes on existing systems).
17. Traditional definitions of corporate social responsibility envision a mix of compliance,
general ethics, and philanthropy. See Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, Corporate Citizenship:
Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 166, 167 (2005)
(critiquing this definition as inadequate and arguing that corporate citizenship should include a
commitment to protect fundamental rights, especially in a global context in which nation-states
may lack the capacity to act alone).
18. Nested within this proposition are a number of further difficulties: How does an
incorporated legal person form views of any kind? Who has the power to decide what views a
corporation will espouse? See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., CorporatePolitical
Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 84 (2010) ("As long as corporations are permitted to
engage in political speech . .. decisional rules governing whether and how they decide to do so are
inevitable."); Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629,
1657 ("While the Court has significantly expanded corporate rights, it has not grounded these
expansions in a coherent concept of corporate personhood.").
19. See Lyman Johnson, Pluralismin Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25
REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 271-72 (2013) ("[T]raditional for-profit corporations ... are legally free to
pursue social or environmental goals and, except in limited circumstances in Delaware most
notably, are not required to maximize corporate profits and/or shareholder wealth."). For a
contrary view focused on Delaware law, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need
for a Clear-Eyed Understandingof the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the
Delaware General CorporationLaw, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 768 (2015), asserting that in
Delaware, "directors must make stockholder welfare their sole end, and that other interests may
be taken into consideration only as a means of promoting stockholder welfare."
20. See Sarah C. Haan, The CEO and the Hydraulics of Campaign FinanceDeregulation,109
Nw. U. L. REV. 269, 277 (2014) (suggesting that "the politicization of the retail marketplace
encourages a rich form of civic participation").
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than governments." 2 1 Hashtag activism gives consumers the ability to
organize and to influence corporate decisions. 22 Whether by their own
choice or because of outside pressure, corporations have become
accountable for the political implications of their economic choices. 2 3
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I demonstrates that
corporate political activity includes exit as well as voice. Part II
contends that heightened public expectations regarding corporate
citizenship make it more difficult for corporations to pretend that their
economic choices are politically neutral. Part III argues that
corporations can serve as mediating institutions and provide an
alternative pathway for citizens to participate in democratic selfgovernance. Part IV identifies two basic rationales for using corporate
exit to register political dissent: (1) attaching economic consequences to
public choices, and (2) avoiding complicity with laws that violate a
corporation's core values.
I. EXIT AS INFLUENCE
No one disputes that corporations spend money on lobbying and
advertising in order to influence political decisions. 24 More
controversial is whether these types of activities should be legally

21. Matten & Crane, supra note 17, at 172 (arguing that citizens seek "to effect political
change by leveraging the power (or vulnerability) of corporations"). Therefore, "corporations here
could be said to have provided an additional conduit . .. through which citizens could exercise their
political rights." Id.
22. For example, the "grab your wallet" campaign has spurred economic boycotts of
businesses accused of supporting the Trump Administration. See #GRABYOURWALLET,
grabyourwallet.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5JFP-XP87]; see also Michael M.
Grynbaum & Sapna Maheshwari, Kawasaki to Stop Sponsoring 'Apprentice'Because of Trump
Involvement, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/business/
kawasaki-to-stop-sponsoring-apprentice-because-of-trump-involvement.html
[https://perma.cc/
H2EE-T7ZM] (noting that the company's decision to withdraw its sponsorship "came after it was
featured by #GrabYourWallet, a grass-roots online campaign to boycott companies with ties to Mr.
Trump, his family and his political donors").
23. See David A. Fahrenthold & Sarah Halzack, Nordstrom Drops Ivanka Trump-Branded
Clothing and Shoes, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
nordstrom-drops-ivanka-trump-branded-clothing-and-shoes/2017/02/02/3f395d10-e9b6-1 1e6b82f-687d6e6a3e7c-story.html?tid=a-inl&utm-term=.2f44a30f7655
[https://perma.cc/5YMDC6GX] (quoting one of the leaders of the "Grab Your Wallet" campaign: "The people who voted
against Donald Trump may have lost at the ballot box, but they can win at the cash register[.]");
Henry Grabar, The Corporate Reaction to the Muslim Ban Has Been Feeble. Here Are Four
Companies That Did It Right, SLATE (Jan. 31, 2017, 9:45 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
moneybox/2017/01/31/thecorporate reaction to the mushmban hasbeenfeeble here are fou
r-companies.html [https://perma.cc/TJ2H-SHCG] ("It's a fine line between corporate politics for
the bottom line and corporate politics for a higher ideal-especially with consumer brands whose
success depends on popular opinion.").
24. See Issacharoff, supra note 15, at 126 ("Any system of privately financed campaigns
invites strategic use of money to influence public officials.").
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protected. 25 Some argue that money lacks expressive value and should
not be equated with political voice. 26 Others accept that the market
economy's metabolic system can convert money to speech but contend
that corporate political activity is troubling for other reasons. 27 For
example, some scholars argue that corporations lack cognizable free
speech rights. 28
This Essay does not seek to resolve long-standing controversies
concerning the regulation of corporate expenditures. 29 Rather, what is
significant for our purposes is the extent to which the question of
corporate political activity has become coextensive with voice. In
particular, First Amendment controversies have crowded out other
ways of understanding political participation. 3o This Part argues that a
more complete account of corporate political activity requires
consideration of both exit and voice.
A. Redefining CorporatePoliticalActivity
If members of an organization become dissatisfied, they have
two basic options available: "voice" and "exit."31 Voice includes "any
attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable
state of affairs." 32 Exit involves a withdrawal of investment and

25. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign
FinanceIncoherenceof McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 32 (2004)
(arguing that the law's distinction between direct and indirect contributions is illogical); Burt
Neuborne, Is Money Different?, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (1999) ("Once money becomes crucial
to effective political speech, disproportionate political power in the system inevitably gravitates to
the people who control the money.").
26. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("Money is property; it is not speech.").
27.

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 94, 98 (1993)

(noting the danger that some well-funded speech will drown out other perspectives). Sunstein
concludes, however, that "speaker-based discrimination" would be improper and that any
regulation of corporate expenditures should be "part of a general effort to reduce the effects of
wealth." Id. at 239.
28. See C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 652 (1982) (arguing that corporate
speech "do[es] not derive from the values or political commitments of any individuals"); Randall P.
Bezanson, InstitutionalSpeech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 739 (1995) (contending that corporate speech
"has no speaker-no point of human origin in the voluntary communicative intention of an
individual").
29. For an overview and a general discussion of corporate personhood, see Margaret M. Blair
& Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of CorporateConstitutionalRights, 56 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1673 (2015).
30. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First Amendment Imperialism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 659, 659
(observing tendency of First Amendment reasoning to displace alternative approaches).
31. See HIRSCHMAN, supranote 4, at 15.
32. Id. at 30.
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participation. 3 3 Those options pertain to groups as small as a single
family or as large as a multinational corporation or nation state.
In market settings, exit is the usual choice. 34 Thus, stockholders
in publicly traded corporations typically register their disapproval of
management's performance by selling their stock. 35 Likewise, if the
quality of a business's goods and services wanes, customers will shift to
competitors. The economic consequences of exit alert managers that
there is a problem to address. 36
When nonmarket concerns predominate, as when members of a
group share ties of intimacy and loyalty, voice is a more common
response. 37 Hirschman observes that "[i]n a whole gamut of human
institutions, from the state to the family, voice, however 'cumbrous,' is
all their members normally have to work with." 3 8 Although exit remains
an option of last resort, individuals prefer not to leave communities
defined by ties of affinity, kinship, or other forms of shared identity if it
is possible to repair the situation.39
Crucially, exit and voice are interrelated mechanisms; one can
affect the other. For example, minority shareholders typically lack exit
rights in closely held corporations, and this diminishes their voice. 40

&

33. See id.
34. See id. at 15-16:
This is the sort of mechanism economics thrives on. It is neat-one either exits or one
does not; it is impersonal . . . and success and failure of the organization are
communicated to it by a set of statistics; and it is indirect-any recovery on the part of
the declining firm comes by courtesy of the Invisible Hand, as an unintended by-product
of the customer's decision to shift.
35. See id. at 4 ("Some customers stop buying the firm's products or ...
leave the
organization.").
36. See id. at 23 ("[U]pon finding out about customer desertion, management undertakes to
repair its failings."); Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, Corporate Social Responsibility After
Disaster, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 973, 987 (2012).
37. In family businesses, for example, voice is essential to the reconciliation of business and
family expectations. See Benjamin Means, Nonniarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 WM.
MARY L. REV. 1185, 1189 (2013) (stating that "a successful family business must find ways to
mediate the tension between expectations rooted in family life and expectations inherent to the
marketplace").
38. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 17.
39. See id. at 16 ("[Voice is just the opposite of exit. It is a far more 'messy' concept because
it can be graduated, all the way frog faint grumbling to violent protest; it implies articulation of
one's critical opinions rather than a frivate, 'secret' vote in the anonymity of a supermarket. . . .").
40. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (noting that a minority
investor "may be without either a voice in protecting his or her interests or any reasonable means
of withdrawing his or her investment"); Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for
Evaluating Claims of Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J.
1207, 1219 (2009) (stating that "the lack of a credible threat of exit may diminish the effectiveness
of minority voice even as it increases its importance"). Unlike public corporation stock, which
trades on national stock exchanges, the stock of closely held corporations does not change hands
often, and there are usually share-transfer restrictions that limit the ability of investors to sell
their shares to outsiders. See Means, supra, at 1218. Even if minority shareholders have a
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Therefore, because their investment is locked in, minority shareholders
that have not bargained for specific contractual exit rights must rely on
voice to influence managerial decisionmaking. 4 1 Yet, without a credible
ability to exit and force the majority to purchase their stock at fair
value, minority shareholders may find that their voice is ignored and
that they are vulnerable to oppression at the hands of the majority. 42
Conversely, exit rights can strengthen voice. For example, NFL
teams have been known to threaten to leave their home city in order to
renegotiate an even more attractive package of taxpayer-funded
subsidies. 4 3 In one case, after suggesting the possibility of a move to Los
Angeles, the Indianapolis Colts were able to obtain $620 million in state
funding for a new football stadium. 4 4 According to the Los Angeles
Times, since 1994 over "half of the NFL's 32 teams have used moving to
L.A. as leverage." 45 When one NFL team finally accepted an offer from
Los Angeles, a commentator opined that the jilted city was lucky to have
lost.46

As NFL negotiating tactics illustrate, corporations in a freemarket economy have the inherent power to decide where to do
business. 4 7 Unlike minority shareholders, therefore, corporations are
theoretical right to sell their shares, the obstacles to arranging for a sale of illiquid minority stock
at fair value are formidable. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass.
1975) ("No outsider would knowingly assume the position of the disadvantaged minority. The
outsider would have the same difficulties.").
41. See Means, supra note 40, at 1218-19 (arguing that minority shareholder voice is
especially important because minority shareholders lack default exit rights).
42. See id. at 1218 ("[S]hareholder oppression stems from lack of exit."); Douglas K. Moll,
Shareholder Oppressionand 'Tair Value": Of Discounts, Dates, and Dastardly Deeds in the Close
Corporation,54 DUKE L.J. 293 (2004).
43. See Nathan Fenno & Sam Farmer, NFL Teams Often Use L.A. to Get Better Deals to Stay
Where They Are, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2015, 8:34 PM), http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-laleverage-city-20150107-story.html [https://perma.cclTUL4-5CJP] ("[O]wners have used the threat
of moving here to improve aging stadiums and bolster bottom lines.").
44. See id.
45.

Id.

46. Joe Nocera, In Losing Rams, St. Louis Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/sports/football/st-louis-should-be-glad-it-lost-therams.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cclJNA2-8SWM] (contending that "the economics underpinning
the recent deal St. Louis and the State of Missouri tried to put together to keep the Rams would
have been financially ruinous").
47. President Trump, however, has sought to influence corporations by threatening to impose
economic consequences on those who outsource production. See Mayumi Negishi & Chieko
Tsuneoka, Trump Tweets Threats, Testing Toyota, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2017, 7:48 AM),
[https://perma.cc/
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-tweets-threats-testing-toyota-1483706884
8Z2A-7LPS] ("After Mr. Trump said 'No way!' to Toyota's plans to build a factory in Mexico and
threatened to slap a tariff on imported cars, shares in the world's largest car maker by market
capitalization fell 1.7% in Tokyo on Friday."). Antitrust law might also supply a constraint if
corporations sought to allocate markets in ways that reduce competition. See generally HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE (5th ed.
2015).
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not forced to rely on their voice. The flexibility to use exit or voice gives
corporations significant political power, especially since exit can
damage a host jurisdiction's economy-indeed, some commentators
assert that business interests in society enjoy a uniquely "privileged
position." 48
What is true of businesses in general may not apply in a
particular case. Therefore, an assessment of any single corporation's
political influence should include consideration of its practical ability to
exit. In the language of economics, the cost of exit can be described in
terms of the "asset-specific" investment involved. For example, a locally
owned business that caters its services to a particular community would
likely find it more expensive to leave than a national corporation that
handles certain "back office" functions in a region but could relocate
anywhere with an office park, college-educated workers, and access to
the internet.
Even if all that is involved is training employees, obtaining a
lease, and the usual transaction costs of opening a business location, it
will be easier for a company to decide not to locate in a community in
the first place than to move existing operations. Thus, businesses
considering whether to make an initial investment in a jurisdiction are
likely to have the maximum leverage and can set conditions for their
investment. On the other hand, elected officials may worry more about
losing existing business revenue than about foregone opportunities to
attract new businesses. 49
In sum, critics of corporate political activity who argue that the
economic power of corporations gives them an outsized political voice
are not wrong, but the analysis is incomplete. What matters is not just
a corporation's willingness to spend money on politics but its ability to
provide jobs and tax revenue, as well as its exit costs. When a
corporation that supports a local economy can relocate easily-or choose
not to make further investments-its political preferences will carry
significant weight.
B. Why Exit Has Been Overlooked
If exit is an integral aspect of corporate political activityindeed, an obvious aspect-it seems anomalous that scholars have
devoted their attention almost entirely to voice-related issues. Apart

48. LINDBLOM, supra note 6, at 175.
49. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and
Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 199-203 (1991) (describing the phenomenon of loss
aversion).
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from the gravitational pull of First Amendment analysis,5 0 two
explanations for this oversight seem plausible. First, exit provides an
economic signal that may affect the political process, but it is not itself
a reasoned contribution to deliberation regarding matters of law or
policy. Second, exit can benefit corporations at the expense of other
constituencies and might therefore be considered a cautionary tale
about unchecked capitalism rather than a tool for political
participation. As discussed below, however, neither of these rationales
justifies the exclusion of corporate exit from analyses of corporate
political activity.
1. Input Versus Deliberation
Arguably, exit is an economic and not a political mechanism and
therefore properly excluded from analyses of corporate political
activity.5 1 Strictly speaking, exit represents a refusal to engage in
politics. By exiting, an individual or entity withdraws from the relevant
community of interest and leaves behind whatever citizenship or
participation rights that might otherwise have existed. From Pericles
on, political participation and citizenship have been intertwined. 52
Someone who is not a stakeholder fully invested in the life of the
community may not deserve to have a prominent role in shaping
outcomes. 5 3
The objection that politics requires dialogue misses the
interrelationship of exit and voice. Exit is not a standalone mechanism
but exists on a spectrum-as a practical matter, the threat of exit will
often suffice. So long as corporations have the power to leave, they may
never need to exercise it. Corporations can simply explain why, if
certain changes are not made, they will exit. In South Carolina, for
example, business executives concerned about the decrepit state of
roads and other infrastructure recently lobbied for a gas tax to cover

50. See Greenwood, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
51. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 15 (noting that exit and voice "faithfully reflect a more
fundamental schism: that between economics and politics. Exit belongs to the former realm, voice
to the latter").
52.

See Pericles, Funeral Oration, in THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

(Rex Warner trans., Penguin Group 1954) (c. 431 B.C.E.), reprinted in POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
THE ESSENTIAL TEXTS 1087, 1089 (Steven M. Cahn ed., 3d ed. 2014) ("[W]e do not say that a man
who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no
business here at all.").
53. According to Hirschman, it is the most loyal customers who are likely to take the trouble
to use voice rather than simply voting with their feet. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 4, at 79-80.
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badly needed repairs. 54 They cautioned that jobs might be lost if the
legislature failed to act.66

Even if corporations resort to exit without first attempting to
change their situation through the voice mechanism, exit has an
important signaling effect and can set the agenda for future legislative
action.5 6 In this regard, the distinction between economic and political
processes is somewhat artificial. At least in societies characterized by
free markets and democracy, public preferences can be aggregated in
either domain, and the consensus in one domain can affect the other.
Moreover, it would be a mistake to characterize large-scale,
modern democracies in terms of an idealized notion of rational
deliberation. Unlike the direct democracies of ancient Athens or
present-day New England town halls, most existing democracies
employ a system of representation: voters elect legislators to represent
their interests and, where necessary, to make trade-offs among
competing goods.5 7 Also, in an era characterized by heightened political
polarization and party-line votes, the deliberative nature of
representative politics should not be overstated.5 8 In sum, corporate
exit may not represent a contribution to political dialogue, but it can be
used in conjunction with corporate voice. And when exercised, it sends
a signal that change is needed.
2. The Race to the Bottom
Scholars may also miss the political salience of exit if they
assume that corporations use their economic leverage solely for their
own benefit. Perhaps for this reason, academic discussions of the
leveraging power of corporations do not connect to broader analyses of

54. Avery G. Wilks, Business Leaders: Raise Gas Tax or Risk Jobs, Development, STATE (Feb.
21, 2017, 12:38 PM), http://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/ article134016734.html
[https://perma.cc/K5Y7-HNCL].
55. See id. The gas tax passed with margins sufficient to override the governor's veto. See
Cassie Cope, How, After 3 Years, the SC Senate Passeda Gas Tax Increase, STATE (Apr. 29, 2017,
11:40 AM), http://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/articlel47588844.html
(last
updated Apr. 29, 2017, 1:08 PM) [https://perma.cc/V5JB-GAGD].
56. See infra Section III.A.
57. Representatives do not take direct instruction from their constituents and are authorized
to act independently based on dialogue and their own conception of the public interest. See JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 358-59 (1971):
The benefits from discussion lie in the fact that even representative legislators are
limited in knowledge and the ability to reason. No one of them knows everything the
others know, or can make all the same inferences that they can draw in concert.
Discussion is a way of combining information and enlarging the range of arguments.
58. See, e.g., Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman, Partisans Without Constraint:Political
Polarizationand Trends in American Public Opinion, 114 AM. J. SOC. 408 (2008).
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corporate political activity and tend to be restricted to areas in which
corporate self-interest may damage other constituencies.
In the corporate law literature, for example, scholars have
debated whether corporations' ability to choose where to legally
incorporate will force states into a "race to the bottom."59 States have
reason to compete for corporate charters and the revenue they can bring
in via filing fees and legal work. Delaware has long dominated the
market for corporate charters, and some allege that its legal rules
privilege corporate interests at the expense of other values. After
decades of empirical work, scholars remain divided about whether the
race to the bottom is a genuine phenomenon.60
There is no question, however, that individual corporations use
their economic leverage to obtain advantages in negotiations with
public officials concerning specific projects.6 1 For example, Tesla
recently "landed a stunning $1.4 billion in tax breaks, free land, and
other beneficence from Nevada to build the factory outside Reno." 6 2 To
achieve that result, Tesla set up a bidding war among seven states. 63
Tesla announced its intention to build a "gigafactory" that would
involve thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in investment, then
gave the states three weeks to assemble proposals including "details on
what enticements the state would offer: tax breaks, free land,
infrastructure improvements, job training, and cash."6 Ultimately,
after acceding to Tesla's shifting demands, Nevada agreed to pay Tesla
"more than $200,000 for each of the 6,500 direct jobs the gigafactory is
supposed to create." 65

59. See Michal Barzuza & David C. Smith, What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax
Law, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 3593, 3593 (2014); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:
Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666 (1974); Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118
HARv. L. REV. 2491, 2495-96 (2005).
60. To the extent federal law sets uniform standards across states, then a race to the bottom,
if one exists, depends on corporations moving operations to other nations. See Massey, supra note
5 (identifying factors relevant to a corporation's decision whether to relocate when a nation
imposes new environmental regulations-in theory, the same analysis applies to intrastate
moves).
61. Corporations may also use their economic leverage to avoid environmental regulations.
See CLARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, CORPORATE CITIZEN? AN ARGUMENT FOR THE SEPARATION OF
CORPORATION AND STATE 200-01 (2016).

62. Peter Elkind, Inside Elon Musk's $1.4 Billion Score, FORTUNE (Nov. 14, 2014, 7:00 AM),
http://fortune.com/inside-elon-musks-billion-dollar-gigafactory/ [https://perma.ccl8EJW-QTBH].
63. Id. New Mexico won an earlier contest for a Tesla factory with an offer worth $20 million
only to have Tesla move when California came in late with a better offer. Id. ("Tesla promptly
abandoned New Mexico. (The company now says it shifted its site because the New Mexico plan
was unworkable.) In California, Tesla has received sales-tax exemptions, which it expects will save
the company $90 million over a decade.").
64. Id.
65. Id.
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Despite the unprecedented sticker price, it is not clear that
Nevada's elected officials were goaded into making an irrational
decision. 66 Although empirical studies of sports stadium deals suggest
that they rarely deliver the economic benefits cities envision,6 7 an
investment of taxpayer resources to attract businesses or retain them
may sometimes be worthwhile. Also, some business projects may not be
sustainable without significant public investment at the front end.68
To the extent corporations use their economic leverage to
demand private benefits, however, it is understandable that
commentators would fail to appreciate the potential value of corporate
exit for democracy. As one journalist summarizes these types of
negotiations, "companies routinely use the cudgel of jobs to extract huge
offers from desperate states-a process that can resemble a
shakedown." 69 Whether or not a "shakedown" should be considered
political might seem to be a debater's point.
In the remainder of this Essay, however, we argue that threats
of corporate exit should not be dismissed as a self-interested tactic for
maximizing profitability. Corporations may also consult internal
principles of social responsibility that guide their activities in ways
intended to produce value for society as well as profits for shareholders.
In this regard, "some firms have, in recent times, engaged in
sociopolitical issues that are divisive, unsettled, emotionally charged,
or contested." 70 The ongoing struggle for LGBT rights is an important
case in point.7 1
Also, as discussed in the next Part, corporations offer a channel
through which consumers or other constituencies can influence politics.
A group that is powerless in majoritarian terms within individual states
may have the savvy to activate corporate power in order to have a
greater impact on democratic discourse. Precisely because they can

66. Nevada made sure that Tesla's subsidies were tied to "targets for job creation and
investment." Id.
67. See Nocera, supra note 46 (arguing that aside from nonpecuniary justifications such as
civic pride, "there is little evidence that professional sports franchises offer lasting economic
benefits").
68. See LINDBLOM, supra note 6, at 173 ("One of the great misconceptions of conventional
economic theory is that businessmen are induced to perform their functions by purchases of their
goods and services, as though the vast productive tasks performed in market-oriented systems
could be motivated solely by exchange relations between buyers and sellers.").
69. Elkind, supra note 62.
70. Michael Nalick et al., Corporate Sociopolitical Involvement: A Reflection of Whose
Preferences?, 30 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 384, 384 (2016). Examples include "same-sex marriage, gun
control, immigration, transgender rights, legalization of marijuana, and the size or role of the
government." Id. at 385. Given a lack of societal consensus, "corporate engagement in these
debates risks alienating certain groups of stakeholders." Id.
71. See infra Section III.B.
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move from one jurisdiction to another, taking substantial economic
value with them, corporations are capable of influencing the spread of
democratic norms.
II. THE POLITICIZATION OF ECONOMIC CHOICES

Many citizens have concluded that their views do not matter and
that their vote does not count. 72 Election statistics bear this out: for
example, only 60.2% of eligible voters participated in the 2016
presidential election.73 The reasons for cynicism are several: access to
politicians is often conditioned on wealth; political districts are drawn
to create as many "safe" districts as possible for the party in charge of
the redistricting process; 74 and elections may be too temporally remote
to provide a satisfactory check on elected officials. Also, because few
points are awarded for political bravery, elected officials may shy away
75
from taking a clear position on contested sociopolitical issues.
At the same time, individuals are increasingly likely to consider
a corporation's political positions when deciding whether to buy its
products. 76 According to a recent survey, most Americans believe that
corporations should "take action to address important issues facing
society."7 7 By creating additional opportunities for participation,
corporations can help to inform public debate and circumvent
democratic bottlenecks that insulate existing views from serious

72. Well-functioning democracies are characterized by "the continuing responsiveness of the
government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals." See ROBERTA. DAHL,
POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971).

73. See Michael P. McDonald, 2016 November General Election Turnout Rates, U.S.
2018)
(last visited Feb. 28,
ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/2016g
[https://perma.c/44GV-HKPV]. Considerably fewer eligible voters take part in non-presidential
year elections. See Michael P. McDonald, National General Election VEP Turnout Rates, 1789(last
Present, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://www.electproject.org/national-1789-present
updated June 11, 2014) [https://perma.cc/6C68-DS7G].
74. See Adam Cox, PartisanFairness and RedistrictingPolitics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 786
(2004).
75. See Nalick et al., supra note 70, at 393 ("Pressure groups can target a firm because of
government inaction on given issues.").
76.

CONE COMMC'NS, 2013 CONE COMMUNICATIONS SOCIAL IMPACT STUDY: THE NEXT CAUSE

EVOLUTION 18 (2013) ("When companies support social and environmental issues, Millennials, like
the general population, respond with increased trust (91%) and loyalty (89%), as well as a stronger
likelihood to buy those companies' products and services (89%).").
77.

GLOB.

STRATEGY

GRP.,

BUSINESS

AND

POLITICS:

Do

2

THEY

MIX?

2

(2016),

http://www.globalstrategygroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/GSG- 016-Business-andare
Americans
("Today,
[https://perma.cc/2SWW-NTMF]
Politics-Study_1-27-16-002.pdf
overwhelmingly supportive of corporate political engagement-88 percent of respondents agree
that corporations have the power to influence social change, and 78 percent agree that companies
should take action to address important issues facing society.").
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challenge. Accordingly, corporations provide an imperfect but genuine
avenue for "representation, accountability, and inclusion."7 8
The concept of corporate social responsibility is not new, 79 and,
subject to legal and practical limits, corporations have always had the
ability to operate where and how they please. It may seem odd,
therefore, that corporations have not employed their economic leverage
in connection with principles of social responsibility-at least not
systematically. Corporations mostly stayed on the sidelines of some of
the most important social movements in the nation's history, including
the fight against Jim Crow laws in the 1960s.8 0
What has changed? Consumer boycotts in America can be traced
back to the Boston Tea Party, and consumer activism has been a
persistent phenomenon ever since.8 1 More recently, however, consumer
activists have adopted a strategy of channeling political preferences
through corporations, which are better positioned to affect societal
norms. 82 When appeals to corporate citizenship alone are not enough,
social activists have used the threat of boycotts to enlist corporations in
their efforts. 83
The argument that corporations should be prepared to engage
socially divisive issues has several parts: (1) social media empowers
78. RAHMAN, supra note 10, at 105 (describing ways in which democratic politics should be
improved). Rahman, like many other commentators, assumes that economically powerful
corporations are an impediment to a well-functioning democracy. Id. at 4. We argue that
corporations can be part of the solution. A corporation's threat to exit a jurisdiction creates
pressure for change and, if deployed as part of a concerted strategy aligned with advocacy groups,
can make public officials accountable to those whose interests they represent.
79. See generally C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An
HistoricalRetrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002).
80. During the civil rights era, activists used sit-ins and other pressure tactics to galvanize
businesses into playing a more constructive role. See Karen Miller Russell & Margot Opdycke
Lamme, Public Relations and Business Responses to the Civil Rights Movement, 39 PUB. REL. REV.
63 (2013). Although some businesses tried to integrate their workforces and others invested in
public education and job training programs, the overall business reaction was mixed and, at best,
mildly supportive. Id. at 71. Despite the protests, for example, Northern businesses continued to
move to the segregated South. Id. at 65 (citing Southward Ho!, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1958, at 1).
81. See LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, BUYING POWER: A HISTORY OF CONSUMER ACTIVISM IN
AMERICA (2009).

82. See, e.g., Lynda V. Mapes, 'DivestmentIs Our Goal': Seattle City Council to Vote on Pulling
$3 Billion fromkWells Fargo oier DakotaAccess Pipeline, SEATTLE TIMES (Peb. 1, 2017, 8:47 AM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/protesters-call-for-seattles-billions-to-bepulled-from-wells-fargo-over-dakota-access-pipeline/
[https://perma.cc/EU4N-UV5P]
("The
proposal is intended to be a blow against construction of the controversial Dakota Access
Pipeline.").
83. See Nalick et al., supra note 70, at 393:
Groups that target firms and activate stakeholder pressure to take a stance on an issue
are often part of social movements, and frequently comprise large, sometimes informal,
groups of individuals or organizations that focus on specific political or social issues to
mobilize and actively contest particular values and beliefs.
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consumer advocates and makes corporate political neutrality
increasingly untenable, (2) the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence
undercuts the traditional defense that corporations should focus only
on shareholder profits, and (3) in the context of global supply-chain
management, corporations have already shown that they can extend
principles of social responsibility to suppliers, industries, and even to
other nations.
A. Social Media
Corporations have no place to hide. For better or worse, a
statement attributed to a corporation or one of its controlling owners
can become global news within hours, and consumers can use social
media to organize boycotts. 84 In today's "hyper-politicized"
atmosphere,8 5 corporations must consider the potential political
implications of their economic decisions.8 6
A few recent examples illustrate the point. New Balance faced
outraged consumers after a spokesperson opined that the election of
Donald Trump would improve the prospects for domestic
manufacturing.8 7 L.L. Bean has been barraged by negative press
84. Rachel Abrams, Early Signs Suggest Trump's Actions Are Taking a Toll on Trump Brand,
N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:30 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/business/the-trumpbrand.html [https://perma.cclLXC4-T5HF] ("At a time when protests and boycotts can easily be
organized online, brands face more pressure to respond to consumer demands."). According to one
scholar, consumer boycotts should be afforded First Amendment protections because they
constitute political expression. See Theresa J. Lee, Democratizing the Economic Sphere: A Case for
the PoliticalBoycott, 115 W. VA. L. REV. 531, 535 (2012) (defining a political consumer boycott "as
a refusal to buy goods or patronize certain business undertaken by individuals in their role as
consumers and citizens in order to effect political or social change").
85. See Monica Hesse, When Even Frosted Flakes Are Political, Where Does That Leave Us as
a Country?, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/ when2 2
07594c60/1 /
even-frosted-flakes-are-political-where-does-that-leave-us-as-a-country/2016/1
[https://perma.cc/ G78Qb8bl-1 1e6-b994-f45a208f7a73_story.html?utm term=.82480c821fd8
X7UR] ("Everything is political these days. Every single decision."); Aamer Madhani, From Boeing
and Nordstrom to Uber and Starbucks: What Company Is Next to Feel a Trump-Era Hit?, USA
TODAY (Feb. 11, 2017, 6:01 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/02/11/ corporate[https://perma.cc/479R-J4TF]
america-faces-tough-balancing-act-age-trump97765250/
("[C]orporate America is trying to adapt to an increasingly unpredictable and hyper-politicized
business climate."); Helaine Olen, So Do We Have to Boycott Everything Now?, SLATE (Feb. 1, 2017,
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the..bills/2017/02/the -trump-inspired
PM),
3:04
boycotts-are startingtogo_toojfar.html [https://perma.cclK64C-NYS7] ("Even the activities of
a sandwich chain are political now.").
86. See James Surowiecki, The Trump-Era Corporate Boycott, NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/01/09/the-trump-era-corporate-boycott
[https://perma.cc/HQP8-3RAZ] (observing that "the Trump boycotts, from both the left and the
right, have been driven by issues extraneous to the targets' core business practices").
87. See Ahiza Garcia, Customers Burn New Balance Shoes over Trump Comments, CNN
MONEY (Nov. 10, 2016, 7:31 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/10/news/companies/trump-newbalance-burning-shoes/ [https://perma.cc/YT8F-FHGX].
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coverage, not because of any direct involvement in politics, but because
one of its family owners contributed money to a PAC supporting the
election of Donald Trump.8 8 Stores that sell Ivanka Trump's brand of
clothing, shoes, or jewelry have faced severe pressure from all sides. 9
When Target announced a policy of permitting individuals to use
"whichever bathroom corresponds with their gender identity,"
conservative activists banded together to boycott the chain.90
The prominence of the "grab your wallet" website highlights how
social media can create new opportunities for consumer activism. The
founder of the website, Shannon Coulter, had little previous experience
in politics but has become an "unlikely general of the digital army now
supporting her campaign." 9 1 Her boycott movement started with a
single tweet and soon evolved into a juggernaut. 92 Several businesses
targeted for boycotts have subsequently dropped Trump-branded
products, though they claim to have done so based solely on sales
figures. 93
B. Citizens United and Hobby Lobby
Social media facilitates the rapid spread of information, but that
alone cannot account for the expectation that corporations will further
political interests in what they choose to sell, how they operate, and
where they operate. The blurring of the line between economic and

.

88. See Daniel Victor, Trump Tweet About L.L. Bean Underscores Potential Danger for
Brands, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/us/politics/linda-bean-11bean-boycott.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cefN3TF-XRK8] ("Mr. Gorman [L.L. Bean's CEO] had
responded to the recent calls for a boycott by saying that L.L. Bean does not endorse political
candidates, make political contributions or support any political agenda, and he described Ms.
Bean's contributions as her personal decision.").
89. See Abha Bhattarai, A Trump Voter's Message to Retailers: 'Keep Your Mouths Shut About
Our President, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
capitalbusiness/a-trump-voters-message-to-retailers-keep-your-mouths-shut-about-ourpresident/ [https://perma.ccl48HU-AGDZ] (finding that both left- and right-leaning groups have
made threats and boycotted retailers for their views on the Trump family).
90. See Travis M. Andrews, Target CEO Responds to Nationwide Boycott of the Store over
Transgender Bathroom Policy, WASH. POST (May 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2016/05/13/target-ceo-responds-to-nationwide-boycott-of-the-store-overtransgender-bathroom-policy/?utm-term=.341e342bd948
[https://perma.cc/4LMC-DWFS]
("We
took a stance, and we're going to continue to embrace our belief of diversity and inclusion. .
(quoting Target CEO Brian Cornell)).
91. Rachel Abrams, The Anti-Trump Activist Taking on Retailers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/business/the-unlikely-general-behind-an-anti-trumpboycott.html [https://perma.cc/J7YX-DVQ3].
92. Id. ("Grab Your Wallet now includes a list of places to shop and not shop, and a short
script for people who want to call companies to complain. As many as 32,000 people visit her site
in an hour, Ms. Coulter said.").
93. Id.
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political activity may be attributable in part to the Supreme Court's
recent jurisprudence concerning the constitutional and statutory rights
of for-profit corporations. 94 By insulating corporations from external
regulation concerning a wide swathe of political and religious activity,
the Supreme Court destabilized the corporation's traditional role in
society.
According to a conservative view of the corporation, "for-profit
corporations should be governed with one end in mind: the generation
of the most profit for their stockholders." 95 Scholars who endorse this
position do not ignore the social costs of corporate activity but argue
that external regulation rather than the idiosyncratic choices of
corporate managers provides the only legitimate basis for aligning
corporate activity with public good.96
However, now that corporations have carte blanche permission
to marshal their economic resources to achieve political ends, a theory
of corporate governance that sets profits as the only objective faces a
serious problem: rational corporations focused solely on shareholder
profits will work for the election of officials who agree to allow
corporations to impose the costs of doing business on others.9 7
Consequently, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission9 8
"undermines conservative corporate theory's reliance upon the
regulatory process as an adequate safeguard against corporate
society
and
constituencies
non-stockholder
for
overreaching
generally."9 9

94. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775 (2014) (extending Religious
Freedom Restoration Act free exercise rights to for-profit corporations); Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (holding that limitations on independent political expenditures made by
corporations violate the First Amendment).
95. Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension
Between Conservative CorporateLaw Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 338
(2015); see also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 53 (2008) (stating that "despite occasional academic arguments to the contrary, the
shareholder wealth maximization norm ... indisputably is the law in the United States").
96. Nalick et al., supra note 70, at 391 ('Managers tend to wield enormous power in firm
decision making, and their decisions can be influenced by their personal biases."); Strine & Walter,
supra note 95, at 339 (noting that legislators must establish appropriate rules to prevent rational
corporate actors from externalizing their costs onto society "while internalizing the resulting
excess profits reaped from those shortcuts").
97. See generally Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder
Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE L.J. FORUM 53 (2009); David G. Yosifon,
The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens
United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2011).
98. 558 U.S. 310.
99. Strine & Walter, supra note 95, at 342. Specifically, Citizens United disallows "greater
regulation of corporate political activity in order to insulate the political process from corporate
influence." Yosifon, supranote 97, at 1199 (noting that Citizens United's holding "makes clear that
the First Amendment precludes such a response"). In Hobby Lobby, the Court betrayed its
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If external regulation can no longer guarantee responsible
corporate conduct, then reluctant corporate law theorists may be
compelled to revisit the rival position, which holds that "corporate law
should empower corporate managers to conduct the affairs of the
corporation in a manner that gives weight to the best interests of the
corporation's employees, consumers, the communities it affects, and
society as a whole." 100 Advocates of corporate social responsibility argue
that corporations "are too powerful and have been accorded too many
rights similar to those given to actual humans for them not to behave
in a socially responsible manner that reflects the full range of concerns
that actual humans consider important."1 0 1 In the wake of Citizens
United and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,102 these arguments
have gained new force. 103
C. Supply Chains
Nor can corporations disclaim responsibility for shaping the
legal environment in which they operate. Recent trends in global
supply-chain management show that corporations can use their
economic leverage to uphold ethical standards across supply chains,
and they have begun to embrace this obligation. For example, one
commentator asserts that "Walmart has done more than the Oslo
Accords to improve environmental conditions in China by saying to
their manufacturers to up their game or else we won't buy from you
anymore." 10 4
Notably, the emphasis on maintaining high standards across
supply chains represents a significant change in attitudes and

ignorance of corporate law when it stated that employees are one of the groups covered by corporate
law rules. See Elizabeth Pollman, ConstitutionalizingCorporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 688
(2016) (noting that "corporate law does not specify the rights and obligations of employees").
Rather, employment and labor laws external to the corporation govern employees' rights. Id.
100. Strine & Walter, supra note 95, at 339; see also David Millon, Redefining CorporateLaw,
24 IND. L. REV. 223, 225-26 (1991) (explaining that corporate management's responsibilities reflect
that corporations are more than just investment vehicles for owners of capital).
101. Strine & Walter, supra note 95, at 339. For an elaboration of different theories of
corporate social responsibility, see Kuo & Means, supra note 36, at 994-1000.
102. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
103. See Pollman, supra note 99, at 690 (arguing that the Court in Hobby Lobby placed the
"interests of five shareholders above those of over 13,000 employees" and thereby "upset the
implicit agreement that allows corporate law to serve as enabling rules for shareholders and
directors because of the assurance that external legal regimes would address the interests of
others"); Yosifon, supranote 97, at 1199 (arguing that the solution "is to alter corporate governance
law so that firms are not managed in the exclusive interests of shareholders, but instead operate
under a multi-stakeholder regime which requires directors to attend directly to the interests of
multiple stakeholders at the level of firm governance").
104. TORRES-SPELLISCY, supranote 61, at 211 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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practice.1 0 5 Corporations once replaced vertically integrated structures
for sourcing materials with independent supply chains in order to limit
the scope of their legal responsibilities. 10 6 By removing themselves from
direct involvement in decisions regarding labor and environmental
practices, businesses could focus on the bottom line without much
concern for how it was achieved.
In a remarkable shift, many of the corporations that control
global supply chains have now acknowledged that their social
responsibilities do not end at the water's edge of the corporate form and
that they are obliged to ensure that their suppliers meet appropriate
standards.1 0 7 No doubt social media has something to do with changing
attitudes; even when corporations are free from the threat of legal
liability, they may face reputational consequences for abusive labor
10 8
practices and environmental harms.
When motivated to provide oversight over supply chains,
corporations have shown that they have the capacity to do so. Because
large retailers and manufacturers have economic leverage, "even when
supply chains exist in a formally free market economy, firms at the apex
of those chains retain enormous power amounting to de facto
operational control." 109 For instance, McDonald's commitment to buy
sustainably sourced cattle has the potential to reshape the cattle

105. Nelson Lichtenstein, Two Cheers for Vertical Integration: Corporate Governance in a
World of Global Supply Chains, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 329, 351 (Naomi R.
Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017) ("Every supply chain consists of a series of subordinate
entities whose prices, production schedules, and labor costs are put under relentless pressure by
the firm or institution that is the ultimate buyer of the product.").
106. See id. at 330 (arguing that global supply chains typically involve tight economic
integration but "combined with a legal regime that absolves those who command the various links
in the supply chain of the kind of responsibility-moral, economic, and legal-attached to those in
formal leadership of the vertically structured corporation that once seemed so central to the
American polity").
107. See, e.g., CSR Environmental Sustainability, CISCO, https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/
about/csr/impactlenvironmental-sustainability.html [https://perma.cc/AG7S-7KGC (last visited
Feb. 28, 2018) ("We multiply our positive impact on people, communities, and the planet by
requiring suppliers to meet the high business standards that we practice every day."). In the
context of global supply chains, the most difficult task may be to ascertain whether suppliers are
complying. See Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747,
753-54 (2014) (describing tactics suppliers may use to conceal their activities).
108. See, e.g., Richard Bilton, Apple 'Failingto Protect Chinese Factory Workers,' BBC NEWS
(Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-30532463 [https://perma.cclX35G-FLL8]
(describing how investigative reporters uncovered unethical practices throughout Apple's supply
chain).
109. Lichtenstein, supranote 105, at 340. Large retailers and manufacturers can easily switch
suppliers if they are dissatisfied. Id. at 347 ("Just as nineteenth-century cotton houses could switch
their source of supply from Mississippi to India or Egypt, so too can cell phones, sweatshirts, and
tennis shoes find their manufacturing home in Honduras, the Pearl River Delta, Ho Chi Minh
City, or Bangladesh.").
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industry. 110 In order to compete for McDonald's business, cattle raisers
must meet McDonald's standards.1 1 1 Noncompliant businesses can be
cut out of the supply chain. 1 12
For another example of how corporate exit can be used to reform
supply chains, consider the efforts of Unilever to achieve environmental
goals. In particular, Unilever has listed "eliminating deforestation" as
one of its key social responsibility initiatives and has stated that the
initiative is meant to apply to the company's supply chains. 113 Although
Unilever states that it is "committed to achieving zero net deforestation
associated with four commodities," it has concentrated its attention on
one of those commodities, palm oil, because Unilever recognizes that it
has "the scale to make a difference."1 1 4 In fact, Unilever is "the world's
largest single buyer of palm oil."115

110. See Alla Katsnelson, Will McDonald's 'SustainableBeef' Burgers Really Be Any Better?,
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
13,
2015,
7:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2015/jan/13/sustainable-beef-mcdonalds-meat-environment
[https://perma.cc/3VBJ659Y] (reporting criticism that the new standards are not enough but noting widespread
agreement that they are a step in the right direction); Burt Rutherford, McDonald's & Walmart
Demand Sustainable Beef-What Does That Really Mean?, BEEF MAG. (Jan. 16, 2014),
http://www.beefmagazine.com/cattle-industry-structure/mcdonald-s-walmart-demandsustainable-beef-what-does-really-mean [https://perma.cc/6NV3-NVSJ] (stating that the "program
will include guidelines on land stewardship, water quality and reduced feed and manure
emissions"); Helping Lead a Global Movement for Beef Sustainability, McDONALD'S,
http://corporate.mcdonalds.comlcorpmcd/scale-for-good/beef-sustainability.html (last visited Feb.
28, 2018) [https://perma.cclWQQ6-KY8D] (reaffirming commitment and describing progress
toward stated goals).
111. Our argument that retailers at the top of global supply chains can use their economic
leverage to advance principles of social responsibility is not an assertion that indirect mechanisms
of control are equivalent to actual ownership. See Lichtenstein, supranote 105, at 348 ("Most firms
have established 'corporate social responsibility' staffs, but such initiatives are but a pale
substitute for the absolute legal and administrative responsibility that reformers once thought a
core function of management."). For our purposes, what is significant is that corporations can use
the power of exit to influence decisions made by legally separate organizations.
112. Bilton, supra note 108 (noting that Apple could respond to the problem of unsafe mining
operations in Indonesia by sourcing tin from another location). Apple stated that while exit would
be easier, "that would also be the lazy and cowardly path, since it would do nothing to improve the
situation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, Apple argued that it has "chosen to
stay engaged and attempt to drive changes on the ground." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Whether exit or voice is preferable in this particular instance, Apple's leverage to demand changes
to mining operations in Indonesia is ultimately preferable to its ability to exit. If the tin Apple
needs is not readily available elsewhere, perhaps limitations on its exit power also explain why
Apple has struggled to enforce its policies regarding working conditions.
113. Eliminating Deforestation Through Advocacy
&
Partnership, UNILEVER,
https://www.unilever.com/sustainable-living/transformational-change/eliminating-deforestationthrough-advocacy-and-partnership/index.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cclB3257JKP] (explaining their goal of eliminating deforestation through advocacy and partnership).
114. Id.
115. Id. ("We purchase nearly 3% of the world's palm oil production and 1% of its soy. This
gives us significant influence. . . .").
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To achieve its objective, Unilever has adopted a three-pronged
strategy: (1) instituting supply-chain standards to require that all
"purchases are fully traceable and certified sustainable," (2) working
with "the whole industry to set and meet high standards, extending
beyond current certification schemes and involving growers, traders,
manufacturers and retailers," and (3) asking "governments and other
partners to embed no-deforestation pledges into national and
international policies."11 6 Thus, just as McDonald's can change cattle
raising practices, the standards Unilever sets for the responsible
sourcing of palm oil are designed to affect the industry as a whole.
In short, the evolving ethics of global supply-chain management
offer corporations a proven model capable of being extended to the
public realm. As illustrated by Unilever's efforts to bring together
industry, nation states, and other stakeholders to create sustainable
palm oil, corporate experience with supply chains already encompasses
direct political activity. 117 The logic for applying supply-chain
management concepts to politics is straightforward-just as
corporations set standards for their suppliers, they can clarify and
dramatize policy issues both for citizens and elected officials.
III. CORPORATIONS AS MEDIATING INSTITUTIONS

Between the individual and the state, mediating institutions
such as families, religious organizations, and voluntary associations
"are the value-generating and value-maintaining agencies in
society."11 8 Corporations are an important mediating institution and,
according to Jonathan Macey, can "play a transformative role in
people's lives, shaping their preferences in important ways."1 19

116. Id.
117. See Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, The New Political Role of Business in a
Globalized World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and Its Implications for the Firm,
Governance, and Democracy, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 899, 899 (2011) ("We suggest that, under the
conditions of globalization, the strict division of labour between private business and nation-state
governance does not hold any more. Many business firms have started to assume social and
political responsibilities that go beyond legal requirements and fill the regulatory vacuum in global
governance.").
118. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO
CIVL SOCIETY 163 (Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996).
119. Jonathan R. Macey, Packaged Preferences and the Institutional Transformation of
Interests, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443, 1443 (1994) (arguing that "individuals trust their mediating
institutions to act as professional decision makers to relieve themselves of the responsibility of
making certain decisions").
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Specifically, those who work for corporations often accept the values of
the workplace as their own out of loyalty to the institution. 120
However, corporate values are not a pre-political fact. As a
mediating institution, the corporation can act on behalf of relatively
less-empowered constituencies, becoming a channel through which
consumers, employees, or other stakeholders influence politics. For
example, as we discuss below, the leveraging power of corporations can
interact with democratic discourse to accelerate the adoption of a norm,
namely the acceptance of LGBT people as full and equal members of the
community. 1 2 1
In this regard, it is important to clarify that our argument does
not assume that corporations are themselves democracies. In fact, the
shareholder franchise is quite limited, and those who hold more stock
have more votes. 1 2 2 In many respects, corporations rely on authority
rather than consensus. To conflate corporate governance with
democratic self-government is to invite confusion. 12 3
Nevertheless, corporations are embedded in markets and must
attract and retain employees. Opportunities for internal dissent
reinforce the multiplicity of ties between economic choices and moral
and political values, and the ways that markets shape and reflect those

120. See id. at 1444 (citing Roger Rosenblatt, How Do Tobacco Executives Live with
Themselves?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 20, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/20/magazine/
how-do-tobacco-executives-live-with-themselves.html?pagewanted=all
[https://perma.cc[L2ECD5EN]).
121. It might be objected that the corporation's political activity will be insincere if driven by
market forces. See, e.g., Haan, supra note 20, at 276 ("If the company is taking a political position
for marketing purposes, it is not advancing a policy preference relevant to the company's
operations, but rather pandering to the political views of the majority of its consumer base.");
Nalick et al., supra note 70, at 393 (noting that a company might seek to appease a vocal, politically
engaged minority). However, even if corporations are somehow less sincere than politicians, there
is no a priori reason to reject a role for corporations in the process of deliberation on matters of
public import.
122. A more complete account of corporate governance would need to account for a variety of
institutions that provide direct or indirect oversight:
[Mlajor corporate governance institutions include the accounting firms that audit public
companies, the credit rating agencies that determine whether their debt is "investment
grade" or not, the market for corporate control that disciplines management of poorly
run companies, the organized stock exchange that promulgates corporate governance
rules, the market for initial public offerings of company shares, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission itself, which regulates markets, oversees corporate disclosure,
and, increasingly, formulates corporate governance policies for public companies.
Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicizationof American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV.
10, 12 (2006).
123. See Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholderand Civic Democracy, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1398 (2006) ("In most instances, investors are not looking for a
democratic experience."). One commentator, however, argues that minority shareholders and
political minorities share features in common. See generally Anupam Chander, Minorities,
Shareholderand Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 (2003).
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values. 124 For example, employees in technology firms have demanded
that their employers cut ties with the Trump Administration. 12 5 If a
corporation's stakeholders reject its message, they can sell stock, resign
employment, 126 withdraw from sponsorship arrangements, 12 7 or acquire
goods and services from its competitors. 128
A. SignalingEffects
As mediating institutions, corporations can amplify the political
views of their constituencies. In particular, corporate exit can have a
reverberating effect on democratic deliberation and political agenda
setting. Exit presents evidence of perceived deficiencies that a
community can either work to correct or decide to accept despite the
economic consequences.

&

124. See Nalick et al., supra note 70, at 392 ("Notably, companies may intervene in
controversial social issues as a mechanism for building trust, legitimacy, and rapport with key
stakeholders such as employees, customers, and activist investors.").
125. See David Streitfeld, Activism Hits Even the Less Flashy Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/20l7/02/12/technology/trump-tech-company2017),
12,
(Feb.
employees.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/5UW9-ZTZ7] (reporting that employees are "agitating for
an explicit corporate morality even as Mr. Trump considers a new executive order on
immigration").
126. The employment market is not as liquid as the stock market, though, and some employees
may not be able to shift jobs without incurring significant costs. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is
Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalismand Its ProblematicImplications, 41
J. CORP. L. 71, 101-02 (2015).
127. See, e.g., Tom Kludt, 21 Companies Pull Ads from 'The O'Reilly Factor' in Growing
11:12 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/
Backlash, CNN MONEY (Apr. 4, 2017,
03/medialmercedes-ads-bill-oreilly/index.html [https://perma.cclLG6D-JG9R] (noting that the
sponsorships were withdrawn after reports that O'Reilly had sexually harassed several women).
Soon thereafter, Fox News terminated its relationship with O'Reilly. See Michael M. Grynbaum
Sapna Maheshwari, Fears of Revolt by Consumers Felled O'Reilly, N.Y. TiMES (Apr. 20, 2017, 5:30
AM),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/business/media/fears-of-revolt-by-consumers-felledbill-oreilly.html? r-0 [https://perma.cc/43QY-NM9B]:
In an era when outrage can be easily channeled online, major brands are well aware of
the risk of revolts from consumers who are increasingly savvy about hitting companies
where it hurts. Brands are not waiting to dissociate themselves from thorny issues that
might alienate their customers, be it Mr. O'Reilly's behavior or a North Carolina law
against transgender bathrooms.
128. These informal control mechanisms work better for publicly traded corporations and for
"consumer-facing" corporations. Businesses that are privately held and that deal mostly with other
businesses rather than with the general public are less accountable. For example, the Koch
brothers invest heavily in conservative and libertarian political causes and face few, if any,
internal constraints. See JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES

BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT 146-47 (2016). The business is privately owned and not
subject to investor pressure. To the extent consumers might be inclined to use economic leverage
to resist those efforts, Koch Industries does not have many consumer-facing facets.
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For example, General Electric ("GE") recently announced that it
would be leaving its headquarters in Fairfield for Boston. 129 GE had
maintained the Fairfield headquarters since 1974.130 The decision to
relocate appears to have been motivated in part by disputes over tax
policy and financial incentives, but GE also felt that it "had outgrown
its dated office campus in suburban Fairfield-a relic of a corporate era
that no longer reflects the sort of environment in which the most
promising talent want to work." 13 1 GE's CEO, Jeff Immelt, explained
that Boston's high-technology infrastructure was a major attraction. 132
Although GE is not a start-up business, Immelt intends for his
employees to operate in a more entrepreneurial environment. 133
By leaving Fairfield, GE has helped to establish a marker for
states and cities that want to compete for high-technology businesses
in the future. No longer will it suffice to set aside room in a suburb for
an office park. 134 Companies want to place their employees in a vibrant
entrepreneurial environment, and that requires public investment in
infrastructure. 135 Companies may also consider the strength of the local
education system, both for employees and their children. In GE's case,
for example, "Boston boasts several world-class universities, which
could deliver GE a ready supply of employees to assist in its transition
from an industrial-era firm to one that can compete in a knowledge
economy." 136

129. Ted Mann & Jon Kamp, General Electric to Move Headquartersto Boston, WALL ST. J.
(Jan.
13,
2016,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/general-electric-plans-to-move8:35 PM),
headquarters-to-boston-1452703676 [https://perma.cc8UNK-G473].
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Jon Chesto, GE CEO Explains Why He's Moving Headquartersto Boston, BOS. GLOBE
(Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/03/24/ceo-tells-boston-businessleaders-why-moving-boston/lj6TiNUnzrnb3QWkEa5ZuM/story.html
[https://perma.cc/ PVV272WL] (reporting that GE's CEO anticipates Boston "playing a pivotal role in the next wave of
technology innovation, one that uses data and analytics to connect machines for big businesses").
133. Id. ("The move ... plays a key role, placing his leadership team in a vibrant city with a
world-renowned innovation scene, instead of in a wooded Connecticut suburb.").
134. See Lauren Weber, GE Among Dozens of Corporate Giants Fleeing Suburbs for Urban
Centers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2416, 8:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-among-dozens-ofcorporate-giants-fleeing-suburbs-for-urban-centers-1452733627
[https://perma.ccl3NK3-4EUV]
(noting that suburban office parks are "falling out of favor" with corporations).
135. See, e.g., Henry Grabar, Trouble in America's Country Club, SLATE (June 2, 2017, 11:31
AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/metropolis/2017/06/something is-wrong with
connecticut.html [https://perma.cc/GE66-FW2E] ("Aetna is expected to announce a move this
summer to pull high-level executives out of Hartford and put them in some creative-class
downtown.").
136. Weber, supra note 134. Moreover, as discussed in the next Section, states that tolerate
discrimination against LGBT people may take themselves out of the running for new business
opportunities.
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Arguably, even when corporations use economic leverage to
serve their own interests, they can promote norms that offer wider
benefits. Depending on the context, corporate exit may serve to
reinforce existing norms or to reveal new norms. If governments
anticipate that they are in the running for economic opportunities, it
creates an incentive to adjust the legislative agenda accordingly. In the
aftermath of any particular competition, a jurisdiction will either have
specific obligations or an incentive to make changes for the next
opportunity. Thus, corporate decisions regarding where to locate
operations can affect public policy in all jurisdictions that compete for
corporate business. 137
Although there is an obvious danger that corporations will push
jurisdictions to relax environmental standards and worker protections,
corporations can also create incentives that benefit society. For
example, in order to compete for knowledge workers, a number of cities
have made aggressive moves to become attractive places to live and
work-and this has spillover benefits for all members of the
community. 138 The recipe for attracting cutting-edge businesses is, not
surprisingly, a recipe for creating a vibrant community-in particular,
researchers have found that the quality of educational opportunities
matters a great deal.' 3 9

137. As one commentator observed regarding high-profile defections from Connecticut to other
jurisdictions, "[tlhe deeper, more daunting question is what besides a tax break will make
Connecticut a place people want to live and work. The state still hasn't found the answer." Grabar,
supra note 135.
138. See, e.g., Linda Musthaler, PittsburghIs a Vibrant Ecosystem for High Tech Companies,
http://www.networkworld.com/
PM),
12:37
2014,
25,
(Sept.
WORLD
NETWORK
article/2687961/careers/pittsburgh-is-a-vibrant-ecosystem-for-high-tech-companies.htm
[https://perma.ccl7G7V-3PZR] ("What was old and obsolete has been reborn to support a thriving
and mutually supportive tech community. In short, Pittsburgh has become the cool place to launch
and grow a high tech company."); Vauhini Vara, How Utah Became the Next Silicon Valley, NEW
YORKER (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/utah-became-next-siliconvalley [https://perma.cclYKP6-F5HE]:
Utah turns out to . .. have features in common with other places involved in the supersector: local universities that graduate a lot of S.T.E.M. students (most notably,
Brigham Young University); policies and infrastructure that attract businesses (for
instance, tax breaks and a light-rail system that connects the state's biggest cities); and
strong relationships among local companies.
139. See Vara, supra note 138:
Brookings researchers argue that Utah's cities, and other places like them, offer a
number of crucial lessons, if governments and businesses elsewhere are willing to heed
them: expand government- and corporate-funded R. &. D.; nurture startups by getting
them capital and other help; improve the pipeline of S.T.E.M. workers through schools,
universities, and corporate-funded training programs; and collaborate to create local
'ecosystems' that encourage super-sector companies to cluster together.
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B. Supporting LGBT Rights
Corporate support for LGBT rights-partly motivated by the
desire to provide safe, desirable working locations for LGBT employees
and allies-demonstrates the power of corporate exit to influence policy
and norms. In recent years, several states have taken steps to enact or
revise religious freedom laws in order to authorize discrimination
against LGBT individuals. 1 4 0 Some of these laws permit individuals and
faith based organizations to refuse to provide services to gay people. 141
Other laws target the use of public restrooms by transgender people,
purporting to restrict an individual's access to the bathroom that
corresponds with their gender identity at birth. Finally, some state laws
prohibit local governments from enacting antidiscrimination
measures. 1 42
The business community has in large part lined up against these
measures. 143 Through public statements, advertising, product offerings,
and special events, corporations have supported gay and transgender
rights. Taking a particularly strong stand, Starbucks' CEO, Howard
Schultz, encouraged those who disagreed with the company's position
to invest their money elsewhere. 144 Other businesses that have publicly

140. Many states had previously enacted religious freedom laws modeled on the federal
Religious Freedom Restoration Act after the Supreme Court held that the federal law did not apply
to the states. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that application of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act to the states exceeded congressional enforcement power under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
141. See, e.g., H.B. 757, 161st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016).
142. See, e.g., Camila Domonoske, North CarolinaPasses Law Blocking Measures to Protect
LGBT People, NPR (Mar. 24, 2016, 11:29 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/ 2 016/03/24/471700323/north-carolina-passes-law-blocking-measures-to-protect-gbt-people
[https://perma.cc/53E6-7N22] (reporting on legislation in North Carolina preventing local
governments from enacting antidiscrimination rules to protect LGBT individuals).
143. Whatever personal beliefs the owners might have, local businesses have reason to
discourage states from engaging in controversial and divisive policymaking that is likely to cause
economic repercussions. See Kristina Torres, Gay MarriageOpponents Win 'ReligiousLiberty' Vote
in Georgia Senate, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Feb. 19, 2016, 6:3.6 PM), http://www.myajc.com/
news/state-regional-govt-politics/gay-marriage-opponents-win-religious-liberty-vote-georgiasenate/d2DOzYRB9XOmdOkhfxniPO/ [https://perma.ccP3U3-KD3F] (noting opposition of the
Georgia business community to anti-LGBT law: "Studies by the Metro Atlanta Chamber and the
Atlanta Convention and Visitors Bureau have suggested a negative economic impact of $1 billion
to $2 billion if national groups began boycotting Georgia or canceling conventions and events based
on perceived discriminatory efforts by the state.").
144. See Aaron Smith, Starbucks CEO Holds His Ground on Gay Marriage,CNN MONEY (Mar.
28, 2013, 11:36 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/26/news/companies/starbucks-gay-marriage/
[https://perma.cc/G7JU-JJLL] (noting that Nike and Microsoft had also supported passage of a law
in the State of Washington authorizing same-sex marriage).

20181

CORPORATE EXIT

1321

supported gay and transgender rights include Disney, 1 4 5 Ford, 1 46 Pepsi
Co.,

14 7

Google,14 8 Facebook,

149

Amazon,15 0 and Apple.15 1 In 2015, when

the issue of same-sex marriage was before the Supreme Court, more
than three hundred businesses signed an amicus brief in support. 152
Not only have corporations voiced support for gay and
transgender rights, they have made clear that oppressive laws will be
met with economic consequences. By refusing to do business in places
that relegate LGBT people to second-class citizenship, corporations
demonstrate their commitment to LGBT rights and signal the
importance of the norm of equality. In supporting LGBT rights,
corporations channel the values of many of their stakeholders. 1 5 3
Although it is difficult to say how political decisions are made in
any particular instance, 1 5 4 the combination of corporate voice and exit
appears to have blocked many such measures from taking effect. As the
following sections illustrate, however, corporate political activity does
not by itself determine outcomes-perhaps frustrating for those who

145. See John Cloud, How Gay Days Made a Home at Disney, TIME (June 21, 2010),
[https://perma.cc/T3V8http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1995839-1,00.html
B8JC] (noting that the festival has run on an annual basis for more than twenty years and is "one
of the largest gay-pride events in the world").
146. M. Alex Johnson, Another Swing of the Pocketbook, NBC (June 1, 2005, 4:36 PM),
http://www.nbenews.comlid/8047423/ns/business-us business/t/another-swingpocketbook/#.WHOVprYrIP [https://perma.cc/4LZK-UFUW] (reporting that Ford has contributed
money to gay rights organizations, "sponsored gay pride celebrations, [and] advertised in gayoriented publications"). Ford has affirmed its support for those policies despite opposition from "a
leading Christian activist group." Id.
147. See Lindsay Stein, Doritos'Rainbow Makeover Is Pretty and Prolific, PRWEEK (Sept. 18,
http://www.prweek.comlarticle/1364692/doritos-rainbow-makeover-pretty-prolific
2015),
[https://perma.ccl3STP-HY2Q] (reporting that Doritos, which is owned by Pepsi's Frito-Lay
division, "partnered with the It Gets Better Project, a nonprofit that aims to provide support and
hope for LGBT youth around the world").
148. Jennifer Swann, Four of Tech's Biggest Names Are Drivingthe Next LGBT Rights Battle,
http://www.takepart.com/article/2015/08/09/equality-act
2015),
9,
(Aug.
TAKEPART
[https://perma.ccl3G3U-WE2S] (describing the proposed Equality Act and noting that, tech
companies aside, supporters also include "American Airlines, General Mills, Microsoft, IBM,
Oracle, Orbitz, Levi Strauss & Co., Nike, and Hewlett-Packard'.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Brief of 379 Employers & Organizations Representing Employers as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 2-13, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556); see also
Nina Totenberg, Record Number of Amicus Briefs Filed in Same-Sex-Marriage Cases, NPR (Apr.
2 2 28
28, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/04/28/40 6 8 0/recordnumber-of-amicus-briefs-filed-in-same-sex-marriage-cases [https://perma.cc/PMR3-XDRX].
153. See Nalick et al., supra note 70, at 393 (noting that "companies that recently took a
position against the LGBT movement or have not joined the chorus of companies that have
advocated in favor of the movement have at times been publicly vilified").
154. See Fisch, supra note 14, at 1569 ("The mixed, complex, and often opaque motives of
political actors create substantial obstacles to studying the effects of corporate political activity.").
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support the cause of equality for LGBT people, but also an encouraging
indication that corporations can involve themselves in political causes
without overwhelming the political process and silencing the will of the
majority.
1. Georgia
In February 2016, the Georgia senate passed a bill, House Bill
757 ("HB 757"),155 known as the "Free Exercise Protection Act," that
would allow faith based organizations to deny services to gay persons.15 6
The reaction from the business community was immediate.157
Hundreds of businesses denounced the bill and some indicated that
they would "reduce investment in Georgia" if the governor signed it into
law.15 8 For example, film and media companies including Disney, the
Weinstein Company, and AMC made clear that the law would endanger
Georgia's multibillion-dollar film industry. 15 9 Also, the NFL warned
that it might pass over Georgia for the 2018 Super Bowl. 160
The opposition to HB 757 included major corporations
headquartered in Atlanta-Delta, Coke, Home Depot, UPS, and Cox
Enterprises. 161 At least one business decided to relocate without waiting
to see whether the bill would become law. 162 Georgia's governor

155. H.B. 757, 161st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016).
156. See Torres, supranote 143 ("Opponents of same-sex marriage won a major victory Friday
when the Georgia Senate approved a measure allowing them to cite religious beliefs in denying
services to gay couples.").
157. See Jackie Wattles, Georgia's 'Anti-LGBT' Bill: These Companies Are Speaking Out the
Loudest, CNN MONEY (Mar. 25, 2016, 11:21 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/25/news/
companies/georgia-religious-freedom-bill [https://perma.cclX2XM-LPXF] (describing the coalition
of more than 480 businesses opposing HB 757).
158. See id. ("'It is unacceptable to our employees and it is unacceptable to all of our
stakeholders. We can't have a program-a major conference or a major employment surge-in
Georgia when it becomes a discriminatory state,' [Salesforce] CEO Marc Benioff told CNN.").
159. See id. ("'Disney and Marvel are inclusive companies, and although we have had great
experiences filming in Georgia, we will plan to take our business elsewhere should any legislation
allowing discriminatory practices be signed into state law,' a Disney spokesperson said.").
160. NFL Says Georgia Religious Exemptions Bill Might Cost Atlanta Super Bowl Bid, Fox
NEWS (Mar. 20, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2016/03/20/nfl-says-georgia-religiousexemptions-bill-might-cost-atlanta-super-bowl-bid.html [https://perma.cc/5FTU-5F3X].
161. Sunnivie Brydum, Georgia Businesses Rally Against 'ReligiousFreedom'Bill, ADVOCATE
(Mar. 2, 2016, 7:07 PM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/2016/3/02/georgia-businesses-rallyagainst-religious-freedom-bill (last updated Nov. 14, 2017, 6:51 AM) [https://perma.cc/CRE9ARG9].
162. Mark Joseph Stern, Georgia Is Poised to Pass a Vicious Anti-gay Law. So This Georgia
Company
Decided
to
Move,
SLATE
(Feb.
22,
2016,
9:31
AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2016/02/22/georgia-religious liberty-bill-spurs_373k compa
nytomoveto_nevada.html [https://perma.cc/Q7FZ-A768] ("373k, a Decatur-based telecom
startup with about 20 employees, decided on Friday to relocate to Nevada-a direct response to
the bill's looming passage.").
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subsequently vetoed the bill and stated that he viewed it as
unnecessary in light of existing protections for religion. 163
2. Indiana
Indiana enacted a religious freedom law effectively authorizing
discrimination against LGBT people but backtracked after a firestorm
of protest threatened to undermine the state's economy. 164 The law was
signed by then-Governor Mike Pence on March 26, 2015, and was
scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2015.165
On March 30, 2015, nine CEOs representing Fortune 500
corporations sent a strongly worded letter to elected officials demanding
"new legislation that makes it clear that neither the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act nor any other Indiana law can be used to justify
discrimination based upon sexual orientation or gender identity." 166
Several corporations also took steps to apply economic
pressure. 167 For example, Angie's List announced that it was canceling
a $40 million headquarters expansion that was touted to add 1,000 jobs

163. See Somashekhar, supra note 7 (" 'I do not think we have to discriminate against anyone
to protect the faith-based community in Georgia, which I and my family have, been a part of for
generations,' [Governor] Deal said at a news conference announcing his decision.").
164. Many prominent supporters of the law, including some present at the signing and
involved in its drafting, made clear that its purpose was to allow business owners to discriminate
against gay people. See Zack Ford, The True Intent of Indiana's 'ReligiousFreedom'Bill, According
to the People Who Helped Write It, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 31, 2015, 1:43 PM),
https://thinkprogress.org/the-true-intent-of-indianas-religious-freedom-bill-according-to-the[https://perma.cc/Z6U4-S57K] (recounting
people-who-helped-write-it-27ce5b1ccf2#.2emeku6ch
statements of the bill's drafters regarding their intent to discriminate). A satirical newspaper
nicely captured the implausibility of characterizing the law any other way. Indiana Governor
Insists New Law Has Nothing to Do with Thing It Explicitly Intended to Do, ONION (Mar. 30, 2015,
1:16 PM), http://www.theonion.comlarticle/indiana-governor-insists-new-law-has-nothing-to-do38330 [https://perma.cc/28K9-LWMP].
165. The law stated, "[A] governmental entity may not substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability." IND. CODE ANN. § 3413-9-8(a) (West 2015). It further stated that the government can only burden a person's free
exercise of religion if it meets strict scrutiny. See id. § 34-13-9-8(b)(2) (requiring that the burden
be "the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest").
166. Indiana'sCorporate Leaders Call for Action on RFRA, WTHR (Mar. 30, 2015, 4:50 PM),
http://www.wthr.com/story/28653210/indianas-corporate-leaders-call-for-action-on-rfra
[https://perma.cc/79XD-RC88]. For a copy of the letter, see Letters from William S. Oesterle et al.,
to Governor Mike Pence et al. (Mar. 30, 2015), http://ftpcontent2.worldnow.com/wthr/
pdflRFRALetters.pdf [https://perma.cclJD9U-SP3A], which highlights, in open letters to lead
state officials, the concerns of business owners regarding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
167. See Robert King, RFRA Boycotts, Bans, and a Growing Backlash, INDY STAR (Apr. 2,
2015, 6:32 AM), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/01/rfra-boycotts-bans(detailing announcements by
growing-backlashl70810178/ [https://perma.cc/JT4W-NKMX]
several corporations that they will no longer host conventions or other business opportunities in
Indiana after the passage of the law).
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over five years and to revitalize a struggling part of Indiana. 168
Salesforce, an Indiana-based company that employs thousands of
people in Indiana immediately moved its annual, multimillion-dollar
conference to New York and threatened to impose further economic
sanctions unless the law was repealed. 16 9 Gen Con threatened to
remove its annual convention, depriving Indiana of approximately $50
million a year. 170
To avoid further fallout, the Indiana legislature prepared a new
bill adding a section entitled "Antidiscrimination Safeguards" to clarify
that the protection of religious freedom does not authorize
discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 171 ThenGovernor Pence signed the new bill and made clear that he wished to
maintain Indiana's probusiness reputation. 172
3. North Carolina
In March 2016, North Carolina's then-Governor Pat McCrory
signed House Bill 2, a law that "requires transgender people to use
public bathrooms that match the gender on their birth certificate and
bars local governments from adopting LGBT protections and minimum

168. See Nalick et al., supra note 70, at 390 (noting that a "firm may choose certain locations,
operations, products or services, or expansions in given areas, all driven by its ideological bent on
a given issue" and citing as an example "when Angie's List CEO Bill Oesterle reneged on a
commitment to expand its Indianapolis headquarters because of a disagreement with Indiana's
passage of a controversial religious freedom law, which critics argued discriminated against
homosexuals"); Tim Evans, Angie's List Canceling Eastside Expansion Over RFRA, INDY STAR
(Mar. 28, 2015, 11:47 AM), http://www.indystar.com/story/money/2015/03/28/angies-list-cancelingeastside-expansion-rfra/70590738/ [https://perma.cc/GC4W-DVES].
169. See Julie Bort, Salesforce CEO Marc Benioff Makes Good on a Threat to Indiana over
Controversial 'Anti-gay' Legislation, BUS.
INSIDER
(Mar. 26,
2015,
2:33 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.comlbenioff-makes-good-on-threat-to-indiana-2015-3
[https://perma.cc/K8M4-423G] (reporting that, in response to the law, the Salesforce CEO canceled
all programs that involve employee or customer travel to Indiana).
170. Tony Cook & Mark Alesia, Gen Con Threatens to Move Convention if Gov. Mike Pence
Signs Religious Freedom Bill, INDY STAR (Mar. 24, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.indystar.com/
story/news/politics/2015/03/24/gen-con-threatens-move-convention-gov-mike-pence-signsreligious-freedom-bill/70393474/ [https://perma.cclTDF3-WVED].
171. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-13-9-0.7 (West 2015).
172. Tony Cook & Brian Eason, Gov. Mike Pence Signs RFRA Fix, IY
STAR (Apr. 1, 2015,
10:37
AM),
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/01/indiana-rfra-deal-setslimited-protections-for-gbt/70766920/ (last updated Apr. 2, 2015, 8:08 PM) [https://perma.cc/
3KBQ-LBYC] ("Our state is rightly celebrated for our pro-business environment, and we enjoy an
international reputation for the hospitality, generosity, tolerance and kindness of our people....
Now that this is behind us, let's move forward together with a renewed commitment to the civility
and respect that make this state great." (quoting then-Governor Mike Pence)); Monica Davey et
al., Indianaand Arkansas Revise Rights Bills, Seeking to Remove Divisive Parts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/us/indiana-arkansas-religious-freedom-bill.html
[https://perma.cclK4W9-RWL6].
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wage laws."173 Within six months, the law had cost North Carolina
approximately $200 million in lost business with no end in sight. 174
For example, "PayPal canceled its planned global operations
center in Charlotte, a $3.6 million investment that would have created
400 jobs with an annual payroll of $20.4 million." 175 Also, a number of
film companies have refused to shoot in North Carolina, Deutsche Bank
relocated some of its operations to Florida, and numerous conventions
were canceled. 1 76 Perhaps the biggest single blow was the NBA's
decision to cancel the All-Star game, an event that would have had $100
million "in regional economic impact."1 77
Governor McCrory's popularity plummeted largely as a result of
the damage House Bill 2 caused to the state's finances and reputation,
and, despite the advantages of incumbency, he lost his bid for reelection
by a narrow margin.1 7 8 To date, however, North Carolina's legislature
has not been able to agree to a repeal measure. 179 In North Carolina
and elsewhere, the political struggle over LGBT rights seems certain to
continue. 18 0
IV. Two THEORIES OF CORPORATE EXIT

Thus far, we have established that corporate exit sends a
political message, and, accordingly, that corporations can use their
economic position as well as their voice to communicate their values.
Further, we have argued that while corporations are not democracies,
173. Alex Kotch, Tallying Up the Mounting Economic Toll of North Carolina'sHB2, FACING S.
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.facingsouth.org/2016/09/tallying-mounting-economic-toll-northcarolinas-hb2 [https://perma.cc/4BJM-TP4l.
174. See id. (tallying the economic losses the State of North Carolina suffered after passing
the bill); Editorial, North Carolina Pays a Price for Bigotry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/opinion/north-carolina-pays-a-price-for-bigotry.html?emc=
etal [https://perma.cc/468Q-FQWK].
175. Kotch, supranote 173.
176. See id. (detailing this economic fallout).
177. Id. The NCAA and ACC have also canceled collegiate sporting events. See id.
178. See Jenny Jarvie, North CarolinaGov. McCrory Concedes He Lost Reelection Bid, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016, 12:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-pat-mccrory-lost20161205-story.html [https://perma.ccN58R-8UVG] ("McCrory became the first North Carolina
governor to lose reelection.").
179. See Katy Steinmetz, Deeply Divided Lawmakers in North Carolina Leave the
Controversial'Bathroom Law'on the Books, TIME (Dec. 22, 2016), http://time.com/4607261/northfailed
the
(detailing
[https://perma.cc/82H2-WK4V]
carolina-bathroom-bill-1gbt-repeall
negotiations to repeal the bill).
180. See Laura Sydell, LGBTQ Advocates Fear 7teligious Freedom' Bills Moving Forward in
States, NPR (Feb. 26, 2017, 5:46 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/26/515585721/1gbtq-advocatesfear-religious-freedom-bills-moving-forward-in-states?sc=17&f-1001&utm-source=iosnewsapp&
utmmedium=Email&utm campaign=app [https://perma.cc/6P9Q-FY2X] (detailing recent and
developing challenges to LGBTQ rights).
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they are mediating institutions responsive to the values of their
stakeholders.
Exit, however, is a strong remedy and must be deployed
sparingly. Corporations that wish to remain in business cannot
plausibly threaten to withdraw from the world. For example, if a
corporation has a choice of locating in one of three imperfect
jurisdictions, it will need to find some way of prioritizing its values.
There may not be an ideal choice available.
In some cases, exit may seem pointless from a practical
standpoint. That is, a corporation may decide that all available
locations are undesirable or that its own economic leverage cannot be
expected to make a difference. By analogy, a consumer dissatisfied with
the travails of commercial air travel might have a hard time deciding
which airline to boycott, even assuming a particular trip offered a
meaningful choice among carriers. To refuse to patronize United is to
support American, and so on. 181
A full assessment of the factors that a particular business might
take into account when deciding whether (and how) to use its exit power
is beyond the scope of our project. 182 In this final Part, however, we
distinguish two kinds of considerations that could motivate exit: (1) the
establishment of a price signal intended to cause a community to
internalize the costs of its behavior and perhaps to change course, and
(2) a moral impetus to avoid coinplicity with conduct that violates a
corporation's core values.
A. PricingInjustice
One of the most attractive features of exit when used to support
social goals such as civil rights is that it puts a price tag on wrongful
behavior. Unlike money a corporation spends on political advertising or
lobbying, the withdrawal of tax revenue and jobs hits voters in the
pocketbook. Moreover, corporations can further reinforce the norms
that they care about by allocating their resources toward jurisdictions
that, for example, do not discriminate against their own citizens.

181. See Christopher Ingraham, Want to Boycott United? Good Luck with That, WASH. POST
(Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/04/11/want-to-boycottunited-good-luck/?utm-term=.843flb0c6962 [https://perma.cc/K7AB-HRW7] ("At the price points
most consumers are willing to pay, the flight experience is essentially identical across the major
air carriers: cramped quarters, headaches, delays and a litany of TSA indignities before you
board.").
182. For example, different types of business associations have different governance features.
Corporations, partnerships, and LLCs all differ in material respects, not to mention their
individual differences in ownership structure and governing documents.
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In a famous essay, Derrick Bell argued for an analogous
statutory mechanism that would grant property owners and business
owners a license to practice racial discrimination. 18 3 Bell contended that
the evils of racism could best be addressed through market mechanisms
rather than legal prohibition. First, by coupling an affordable license
with a strong penalty provision for those who discriminate without a
license, the statute would induce business owners to acknowledge their
own racism. 184 Perhaps surfacing such impulses could serve to
discourage them. Even if not, over time the stigma of being a racist
establishment could create external economic consequences and lead
the owners to voluntarily change course.
Second, the license would generate an ongoing stream of revenue
that could be "placed in an 'equality fund' used to underwrite black
businesses, to offer no-interest mortgage loans for black home buyers,
and to provide scholarships for black students seeking college and
vocational education." 185 These tangible benefits would, Bell argued,
outweigh the illusory goal of combating racism in society. 186 According
to Bell, racism is a permanent fact of life in America and the answer is
to find practical mechanisms for adjusting to it. 187
Of course, businesses do not write laws-whether to prohibit
conduct or authorize it-but their use of exit can create a de facto
version of Bell's license to discriminate. Thus, to the extent Bell's policy
arguments are sensible, they would seem to apply as well to corporate
exit. Some of the best examples in this regard involve collegiate and
professional sports organizations. For example, until South Carolina
removed the confederate flag from its Statehouse grounds, the NCAA
refused to schedule tournaments in the state. 188 Arizona's refusal to
honor Martin Luther King, Jr. made it ineligible to host the Super
Bowl. 189 And, as noted above, the NBA and the NCAA threatened to

183. DERRICK BELL, The Racial Preference Licensing Act, in FACES AT THE BO'ITOM OF THE
wELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 47, 48 (1992).

&

184. Id. at 61-62.
185. Id. at 48-49.
186. Id. at 62-63 (arguing that, in order to make a difference, "[clivil rights advocates must
first see the racial world as it is").
187. Id.
188. See Prentiss Findlay, NAACP, NCAA Plan to End Boycott of South Carolina, POST
COURIER (July 8, 2015), http://www.postandcourier.comlarchives/naacp-ncaa-plan-to-end-boycott[https://perma.ccIW2HKof-south-carolinalarticle-a7b4da97-3eb2-57f3-8948-39fmdb2f016f.html
YZ36] ("The NAACP and NCAA are both poised to lift their boycotts of South Carolina now that
the Confederate flag will be removed from the Statehouse grounds.").
189. See Marc Berman, Arizona's Experience with Controversial Laws and Boycotts, WASH.
POST (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/02/26/arizonas[https://perma.cc/
experience-with-controversial-laws-and-boycotts/9utm-term=. 17028671cea6
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boycott North Carolina until it rescinded laws targeting transgender
individuals. 190 In each case, the state chose to pay an annual fee (in the
form of foregone revenue) until it elected to change course.
In one important respect, however, the analogy between Bell's
hypothetical license and corporate exit is inexact, and this discrepancy
helps to illuminate a different set of motivations for exit. Even
assuming that a license to discriminate could be implemented and that
it would produce the benefits Bell identifies, the strongest objection to
such a scheme is that it implicates the state in racial discrimination.
Instead of prohibiting discrimination, the state would be involved in a
licensure scheme-selling the right to treat others unequally based on
the color of their skin. 191 By contrast, when corporations choose to exit
in protest, the economic consequences they create are aligned with the
moral stand they take. As discussed in the next Section, exit may be
justified even if a corporation lacks the economic leverage to effect
change.
B. Avoiding Complicity
Corporate exit communicates total, unyielding disagreement
with a law or policy. The choice to engage in dialogue does not ordinarily
send as strong a signal, even if the message is identical and delivered
forcefully. For example, at President Trump's request, a number of
CEOs agreed to join the President's Strategic and Policy Forum, an
informal group of business advisors. 192 However, the political difficulty
of associating with the Trump Administration became clear in the wake

TGR3-K5HD] ("It took until November 1992 for the state to finally create the King holiday, after
it had lost hundreds of millions of dollars in business over the five years leading up to that point.").
190. See Marc Tracy, N.C.AA. Ends Boycott of North CarolinaAfter So-Called Bathroom Bill
Is Repealed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/sports/ncaa-hb2north-carolina-boycott-bathroom-bill.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/BN93-MAZU].
191. As Bell put it, civil rights leaders "would be unwilling to-as they might put it-'squander
our high principles in return for a mess of segregation-tainted pottage.' " BELL, supra note 183, at
59.
192. PressRelease - President-electDonaldJ. Trump Announces Travis Kalanickof Uber, Elon
Musk of SpaceX and Tesla, and Indra Nooyi of PepsiCo to Join President'sStrategic and Policy
Forum, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Dec. 14, 2016),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=119785 [https://perma.cc/83SG-LTWZ]; see also Rob Price, Elon Mush and Uber
CEO Travis Kalanich Are Joining Trump's Economic Advisory Team, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 14, 2016,
9:27 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/tesla-ceo-elon-musk-uber-travis-kalanick-join-donaldtrump-strategic-policy-forum-economic-team-2016-12
[https://perma.cc/FX4U-L5PU] (reporting
on a press release by President-elect Trump's transition team listing new members of an economic
advisory board).
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of his executive order banning immigrants and refugees from seven
predominantly Muslim nations. 193
On the one hand, access to the President could provide a means
for informing him of the consequences of his actions and perhaps
dissuading him from undertaking even more damaging measures. 194
While criticizing the President's immigration order, Uber's CEO
initially made the case for engagement: "[W]e've taken the view that in
order to serve cities you need to give their citizens a voice, a seat at the
table. We partner around the world optimistically in the belief that by
speaking up and engaging we can make a difference." 19 5 On the other
hand, there was the danger that a CEO's presence would provide
material support for the President's immigration policy, thereby
strengthening the President's hand. As one commentator described the
choice, "Does a meeting with Trump offer influence, or just symbolic
support?" 196

Ultimately, after President Trump failed to offer an unqualified
condemnation of rioting by white supremacists in Charlottesville,
Virginia, many of the CEOs concluded en masse that the risk of being
tarnished by association outweighed the possible benefits of further
dialogue:

193. See Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry in the United States, Exec. Order
No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/01/27/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states
[https://perma.cc/3UVR-XEBP].
194. Elon Musk, the CEO of Tesla, has defended his presence on the council on these grounds.
Jason Del Rey, Elon Musk Says Activists Should Be Happy That He's Advising President Trump,
RECODE (Feb. 5, 2017, 8:21 PM), http://www.recode.net/2017/2/5/ 14516366/elon-musk-trumpbusiness-council-activists-moderates-extremists [https:/perma.cc/ 2KNH-ZMH8].
195. Travis Kalanick, Standing Up for What's Right, FACEBOOK (Jan. 28, 2016, 4:34 PM),
https://www.facebook.com/traviskal/posts/1331814113506421 [https://perma.cc/4P9J-M7TQ]. To
put it mildly, Kalanick's position was not well received. See Matthew Dessem, Why #DeleteUber
Took Off on Saturday Night: 'IDon't Need a Ride to Vichy,' SLATE (Jan. 29, 2017, 7:35 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-slatest/2017/01/29/why-users deleted uberinresponse-to_trum
p-s-executive order.html [https://perma.cc/89M7-496X]. Kalanick resigned from President
Trump's council of business advisors after angry customers began deleting the Uber app. See
Henry Grabar, Actually, It's a Good Thing That Travis Kalanick Quit Trump for Business Reasons,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/
PM),
7:22
2017,
2,
(Feb.
SLATE
2017/02/02/actuallyit-s-a-good thing-that travis kalanick-quit-trump-for-business.html
[https://perma.cclP4HN-CDUX] (stating that "it's obvious that Kalanick quit the council not
because of his burgeoning disgust with the president's policies, but because of the swift reaction
from customers").

196. Grabar, supra note 195. As for executives who remained on the council despite the
immigration order, new opportunities to revisit that decision soon arose. See Julia Horowitz, Elon
Musk to Thump: You Quit Paris, So I Quit You, CNN MONEY (June 2, 2017, 12:58 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/01/news/elon-musk-resigns-trump-adviser/index.html
[https://perma.ccfUUG3-9TAS] (reporting that Tesla CEO Elon Musk and Disney CEO Bob Iger
resigned from the business advisory council because of President Trump's decision to withdraw
from a global pact intended to combat climate change).
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[I]n a rebuke to the president, who suggested that both the racist groups and the
counterprotesters ... were to blame for the violence there, a wave of chief executives who
had agreed to advise Mr. Trump quit his business advisory councils, leading to the
dissolution of two groups. 197

The collapse of the business advisory councils conveyed a message to
the President-he could cater to white supremacists or participate in
polite society, not both.
Corporate exit as dissent is explicable in terms proposed by
Henry David Thoreau in his classic essay, On the Duty of Civil
Disobedience.19 8 Writing at a time when slavery was still legal
throughout the South, Thoreau argued that if a person does not actively
contest government wrongs, "it is his duty, at least, to wash his hands
of it, and . . . not to give it practically his support." 199 For Thoreau, this
duty meant more than voting; to avoid the "disgrace" of association with
a government that countenanced slavery, among other wrongs, an
individual ought to withhold all support, including tax revenue. 200
By relocating, corporations deprive jurisdictions of tax revenue
and jobs; it is this kind of pressure that Thoreau believed was necessary
to effect change. To be sure, a corporation's shift from one jurisdiction
to another, partly motivated by profits, is not to be equated with civil
disobedience and the braving of legal penalties for the sake of spiritual
virtue. 201 Nevertheless, a boycott sends a strong message.
However, as Thoreau also observed, likelihood of success is not
the only criterion for a principled decision to exit. Perhaps other
corporations will take the place of those who leave; perhaps a single
corporation is too small, economically speaking, to matter. Even so,
doing the right thing has intrinsic value. For example, when Georgia's
legislature passed a bill authorizing discrimination against same-sex
couples, a twenty-person telecommunications firm decided to move to
Nevada as a matter of principle:
If we stayed, we would be funding Georgia's hate. For every dollar that we make, the state
of Georgia gets some. As a black, gay male, I don't feel good funding hate. I've never done

197. David Gelles, The Moral Voice of Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/19/business/moral-voice-ceos.html?mwrsm=Email&_r-0
[https://perma.cclT9WG-2U4K].
198. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 269 (Penguin Books 2017)
(1849).
199. Id. at 277.
200. Id. at 274 ("How does it become a man to behave toward this American government today?
I answer, that he cannot without disgrace be associated with it.").
201. On the other hand, Thoreau's own one-night sojourn in jail was hardly an unsupportable
sacrifice. And, if that is unfair-it was a friend who paid the tax, not at Thoreau's request-the
larger point is that principled stands need not involve total sacrifice.
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it, and I'm not going to start now. We're gonna make it known that we don't appreciate it.
We're leaving and taking our tax dollars with us. 202

In addition to its economic consequences, exit has expressive
value. To criticize someone's views from within a shared community of
interest is to communicate from a baseline position of respect; to
"unfriend" someone on Facebook because of their politics is to say that
the person is unworthy of further engagement. 203 Disengagement is
both a strategy and a reflection of moral commitment. 204 Likewise,
when corporations withdraw from jurisdictions to protest violations of
civil rights, there may be important economic consequences, but the exit
also contributes to democratic discourse by signaling dissent in the
strongest possible terms.
CONCLUSION

In Citizens United v. FederalElection Commission, the Supreme
Court held that corporations have a constitutional right to spend
unlimited amounts of money for the election of their preferred political
candidates. 205 Consequently, some have concluded, that "American
democracy is for sale to the highest corporate bidder." 206 Such dire
statements exaggerate the significance of corporate expenditures;
corporations do not need Citizens United to bend the ears of elected
officials who care about tax revenue and jobs. Nor would redrawing the
boundaries of the First Amendment keep corporations out of the public
sphere.
This Essay contributes to the literature on corporate political
activity by identifying the salience of exit as a form of political activity.
202. Stern, supranote 162. The company, 373k, Inc., picked Nevada because of its progressive
stance on gay rights. Id. ("We thought it'd be really dumb for us to move out of our own oppressive
state right into another.").
203. See Darren Samuelsohn, Trump and Clinton Wreck Facebook Friendships, POLITICO
(Aug. 19, 2016, 5:03 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-hillary-clintonfacebook-friendships-227175 [https://perma.cc/R5HL-9FDWI.
204. See, e.g., Zack Linly, It's Time to Stop Talking About Racism with White People, WASH.
POST (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/09/07/its-time-tostop-talking-about-racism-with-white-people/?utm term=.lad8ef5480ec [https://perma.cc/97KNFRSC]:
The fact is, we can fight systemic racism without white validation. We can continue
shutting down bridges and highways every time there's a new Alton Sterling, Philando
Castile or Korryn Gaines in the news and let white folks complain about the intrusion
on their lives. We can continue moving our black dollars into black banks and keeping
our money in our businesses and communities. We don't need them to "get it" for us to
keep fighting.
205. 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010).
206. Floyd Abrams & Burt Neuborne, Debating 'Citizens United,' NATION (Jan. 13, 2011),
https://www.thenation.comlarticle/debating-citizens-united/ [https://perma.cc/CED4-LRBZ].
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From the "grab your wallet" campaign to the fight for LGBT rights in
states such as Georgia, Indiana, and North Carolina, corporate exit has
played a significant role in recent political controversies. In particular,
corporations that align their actions with their words have more
influence in public affairs; the power of exit enhances the power of
voice. 207
Although corporations run on hierarchy and authority, corporate
exit should not be dismissed as an antidemocratic circumvention of the
popular will. Corporations are market institutions susceptible to
pressure from consumers,
employees, investors,
and other
stakeholders. By creating a pathway for citizens to participate in public
decisionmaking, corporations can help to promote democratic values of
accountability, equality, and inclusion.

207. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note
complementary mechanisms).

4, at 123-24 (observing that voice and exit are

